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SUMMARY
The objective of this research program is to extend the recent advances
in robust control system design of multivariable systems to sensor failure
detection, isolation, and accommodation (DIAl, and estimator design. This
effort provides analysis tools to quantify the trade-off between performance
robustness and DIA sensitivity, which are to be used to achieve higher levels
of performance robustness for given levels of DIA sensitivity. An
innovations-based DIA scheme is used. Estimators, which depend upon a model
of the process and process inputs and outputs, are used to generate these
innovations. Thresholds used to determine Failure detection are computed
based on bounds on modeling errors, noise properties, and the class of
failures. The applicability of the newly developed tools are demonstrated on
a multivariable aircraft turbojet engine example.
A new concept called the threshold selector was developed under this
_rogram. It r_pretants ,t _ignif_cant and _nnovative _ooI _or the analys_s _na
synthesis of OIA algorithms. Analytical results were obtained for the SISO
case to compute optimal thresholds and to determine the size of minimum
detectable failures, and a computer-aided technique was developed For the
multivariable case.
The estimators were made robust by introduction of an internal model and
by frequency shaping. The internal model provides asymptotically unbiased
filter estimates. The incorporation of frequency shaping of the LQG cost
functional modifies the estimator design to make it suitable for sensor
failure DIA.
The results are compared with previous studies which used thresholds that
were selected empirically. Comparison of these two techniques on a nonlinear
dynamic engine simulation shows improved performance of the new method
compared to previous techniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of analytical redundancy (as opposed to hardware redundancy) For
actuator/sensor failure detection, !solation, and accommodation (DIA) has been
an active area of research during the last decade. Failure detection is the
process of determining if a malfunction has occurred in a system. Failures in
a system are detectable if the outputs following the failure are statistically
different from the outputs prior to the failure. Failure detection implies
that a no-failure condition can be differentiated from a failure condition.
It does not imply that in the case of a failure, various failures can be dif-
ferentiated from each other. Failure isolation is the process of differenti-
ating between various failures which may occur in a system. Any two failures
may be differentiated from each other if the outputs following them are sta-
tlstlcally different. In general, more complex data processing is required
for isolation than for detection. Failure accommodation refers to the substi-
tution of a synthesized value for the faulty sensor's output.
The various techniques that have been developed _or DIA c_n jenerally _e
thought of as belonging to three categories: failure-sensitive filters,
multiple-hypothesis filter detectors, and innovations-based detection sys-
tems. A survey of various techniques up to 1975 can be found in Ref. l and
references to the more recent work is contained_in Refs. 2, 3, and 27. In
Ref. I, the issue of robustness of various techniques was pointed out as an
open area for research. However, little has been done in the way of robust-
ness analysis for various failure detection schemes. This study seems to be
the first to address this important issue directly. It presents a systematic
solution based on recent robustness analysis and design techniques [14] devel-
oped for multivariable systems. For example, Clark [2] points out the impor-
tance of robustness but his schemes have no guaranteed robustness properties.
Leininger _4} addresses the problem of parameter uncertainty (D.C. mismatch),
but does not come up with a remedy to guarantee robustness. The use of adap-
tivity for failure detection was discussed in a recent report [5]. However,
these techniques are known to have undesirable robustness properties unless
high-frequency unmodeled dynamics are taken into account.
This report addresses the important issue of robustness of sensor failure
detection, isolation, and accommodation(DIA) techniques. The approach is
based on extensions of robust control and estimation techniques and unifies
various DIA methods. It is important to note that the method has been made
practical so as to makean immediate impact on applied technology.
l.l PROBLEMSTATEMENT
The overall problem addressed in this report is the design of a robust,
multivariable control system for a jet engine. A typical block diagram of
such a system is shownin Figure 1.I. The blocks in the forward loop -- the
actuators, plant dynamics, and sensors -- constitute the system. The blocks
in the feedback system -- the control law, DIA logic, and the state estimator
contain the subsystems which are to be designed. The design objective,
ideally, is to select the proper configuration of these feedback subsystems
such that the closed-loop system exhibits performance robustness with respect
to system uncertainties and sensor failures.
!n this _t:Jdy, the control law obtained From Refs. 5 _nd 7 was _Jsed _nd
only the DIA subsystem was designed. In general, a comprehensive design tech-
nique would also consider the design of the control law as well.
Performance robustness requirements can be stated as tolerances on:
(PI) asymptotic behavior, e.g., steady-state command following and
disturbance rejection; and
(P2) transient behavior, e.g., speed of response, damping, over-
shoot, etc.
(P3) detection and isolation sensitivity, e.g. ability and speed of
correctly detecting a sensor failure.
Uncertainties in the system are caused by:
(UI) uncertain parameter values in the models of the actuators,
plant dynamics, and sensors;
(U2) unmodeled dynamics, e.g., the effect of neglecting high-
frequency phenomena, neglecting nonlinearities, and
intentional reduced-order modeling;
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(U3) sensor failures of a known type, e.g., slow drift in a sensor
bias;
(U4) DIA reconfiguration of the estimator and/or control law when
the DIA presumes a sensor failure; and
(US) uncertain external signals, e.g., sensor noise and
disturbances.
Model uncertainties of the type in (Ul) affect the steady-state
(asymptotic) behavior and are the predominant cause of estimator bias and
steady-state regulation errors. Those of the type in (U2) typically have a
greater effect at higher frequencies and show up in the transient response as
(possibly) undesirable behavior. A primary goal of this effort is to quantify
the effect of these uncertainties (UI-U5) on DIA system performance and
provide a design approach for improving DIA performance (PI-P3).
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
The general contribution of this research has been the extension of
recent advances in robust control system design to sensor DIA and estimator
design. The _oecific chntributions _re:
- analysis tools with which to quantify the trade-off between
performance robustness and DIA sensitivity;
- design methods which allow higher levels of performance
robustness to be achieved for given levels of DIA sensitivity;
- demonstration of the applicability of these tools using an
aircraft turbine jet engine multivariable control example.
The requirement for these goals is explained with the aid of Figure 1.2.
Plotted (conceptually) are levels of performance robustness against DIA
sensitivity. A trade-off is indicated. As a design becomes more robust, it
becomes less sensitive. Alternately, For a given level of OIA sensitivity,
there is a maximum level of performance robustness achievable within the
estimator and DIA logic design being applied. There are three curves in
Figure 1.2. The one labeled "current" refers to the current state of the art
DIA algorithms. The curve labeled "robust" refers to the idea of making the
OIA robust. This is the subject of the present study and will result in
PERFORMANCE
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Figure 1.2 Performance Robustness vs. OIA Sensitivity
higher levels of performance robustness. The curve labeled "adaptive" points
to the fact that even Further improvements in performance maybe achievable by
an adaptive scheme. This requires basic research and would be the subject of
Future studies.
Curves such as those indicated in Figure 1.2, and more specifically in
Figure 1.3, constitute a powerful design aid. The quantities in these figures
will be defined precisely in the body of the report and these figures are
presented here only to provide a flavor of the results to be discussed.
Figure 1.3(a) showsthe threshold, Jth' in an innovations-based DIA scheme
as a function of a moving detection window, T. This threshold is a fixed
level against which somemeasureof the innovations signal is being compared.
A failure is declared if the measureexceeds the threshold. Figure 1.3(b)
showsthe minimumdetectable level of failure which is possible for a given
DIA technique. Thesecurves are functions of model error bounds, R.M.S.
noise, and the class of failure signals. Figure 1.3(b) showsthat the effect
of different estimator speeds can also be evaluated. The ability to generate
these curves is a powerful synthesis tool.
Plots such as shownin Figure 1.3 provide the meansby which to evaluate
design modifications madein search of the proper balance of robustness and
DIA sensitivity. Furthermore, they provide information applicable to
optimizing the search. The sensitivities of the system performance to design
changesare caiculatedand the effects of critical parameters are identified.
This research has developed the analysis tools required to construct
these curves. In particular:
a "threshold selector" has been created which quantifies the
effects of uncertainty on DIA performance;
measureshave been derived to quantify the uncertainty and the
performance robustness.
This study has also provided advances to robust estimator design to
achieve higher levels of performance robustness. Specifically, the
accomplishments are:
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the development of estimators using the "internal model
principle" to achieve asymptotic convergence despite model error;
the incorporation of frequency weighting in an LQGcost
functional to modify an estimator design to be suitable For
sensor failure DIA.
1.3 BACKGROUND
1.3.1 Previous Proqrams
Under subcontract to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (PWA), Systems Control
Technology, Inc. (SCT) conducted two previous studies in the area of sensor
DIA under NASA contracts NAS3-22481, "Sensor Failure Detection System" and
NAS3-23282, "Sensor Failure Detection for Jet Engines." The present program
is an extension of these studies. The ultimate objective of all these
programs is to provide sensor fail operational control capability while
minimizing the required sensor hardware redundancy.
"Sensor Failure Detection System," NAS3-2248! [Bl)
The objective of this study was to develop an advanced concept for the
DIA of sensor failures in gas turbine engine control systems. Five concepts
were formulated from advanced techniques for sensor DIA. These concepts were
evaluated by application to a turbofan engine and multivariable control system
simulation. A simplified version of the simulation was used in the
preliminary screening process to select one of the DIA concepts. This
simplified model was also used for the filter designs in the various DIA
concepts.
A functional diagram of the selected advanced concept is shown in Figure
1.4. A normal mode filter, i.e., a filter designed to use all sensor inputs
with no failures assumed on those inputs, was used to generate the filter
residuals and the estimated measurements. The DIA concept used innovations
from the filter to detect hard failures and used the weigh ced sum-squared
residuals (WSSR) technique to detect soft failures. Isolation of soft
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0 Failures was accomplished by likelihood ratio (LR) based testing of
innovations from a bank of Kalman filters, each designed with the assumption
of one failed input. Accommodation was accomplished by reconfiguring the
normal mode filter to eliminate the failed sensor from the inputs to the
filter. The DIA concept is summarized in Table l.l. The DIA concept selected
was compared against a baseline DIA concept based on the conventiona|
techniques of parameter synthesis.
-i
Table I.I
Advanced Concept for Detecting, Isolating, and Accommodating
Sensor Failures
Detection Innovations testing based on WSSR technique for soft
failure. Innovations testing against thresholds for
hard failures.
Isolation On-line isolation of hard failures using innovations
testing; off-line isolation of soft failures using LR
technique. Both structures employ bank of Kalman
filters.
Accommodation Reconfiguration and reinitialization of normal mode
filter.
The configuration of the multivariable control and the components of the
DIA logic used in conjunction with the engine simulation is shown in Figure
1.5. The form of the control law is given by
Au = Ub+ Cp(Zp - zpb) + CI (z I - Zlb) dt (l.l)
BLc]T "
where u is the input vector [WF AH ClVV RCVV , Zp is the estimate of
theA output vector, [NI N2 PT4 PT6 FTIT] T, and z I is a subset of the vector
Zp. denotes the estimates, ub, zpb, and Zlb are the base point vectors
and Cp and CI are proportional and integral control gain matrices. The
proportional part of the control law provides regulation and the integral part
provides trim for the fan speed (NI) and augmentor pressure (PT6). Note that
the control law uses the estimates For both the proportional and integral
portions.
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As a result of this program, the advanced DIA concept was shown to be a
viable DIA technique for application to gas turbine engines. While the
performance of the advanced concept was generally good and its feasibility was
demonstrated, several problem areas were identified. These included:
- steady-state and dynamic mismatch of the simplified nonlinear
model;
- steady-state estimate errors with no failures induced;
- instabilities when accommodating failures;
- accommodation inaccuracies;
- missed detections and false alarms; and
- limited coverage on the flight envelope.
The models used in the no-failure filter and the isolation filters
contained modeling errors which contributed to the above problems. The hard
and soft failure-detection thresholds and the soft failure-isolation threshold
were chosen empirically. They encompassed an estimate of model errors, and
estimates of sensor noise and bias errors, and a built-in safety factor.
Since the model errors were large, the thresholds were large and contributed
to missed detections and False alarms and the overall poor detection
performance for very slow drift failures.
"Sensor Failure Detection for Jet Enqines., NAS3-23282 Fg_
The objective of this program was to develop refinements to the sensor
failure OIA algorithm (Figure 1.4) developed under NASA Contract NAS3-224Bl.
These refinements included:
improvement of the steady-state accuracy of the simplified model
of the engine;
improvement of the dynamic characteristics of the simplified
model to be comparable with the nonlinear thermodynamic
simulation;
refinements to the DIA algorithm to be compatible with the
improved model;
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- elimination of the steady-state errors with no sensor failures
caused by biased filter estimates;
- accommodationinaccuracies in case of failure detection and
isolation;
- missed failure detections and false alarms.
Three revisions were developed and evaluated to address the above
improvements. A detailed, nonlinear thermodynamic simulation was used to
evaluate each revision. As a result, one revision was chosen for detailed
evaluation and Full envelope operation. This DIA algorithm has been
programmed on a real-tlme, microprocessor-based controls computer [lO, Ill at
NASA Lewis Research Center in preparation for testing as part of a closed-loop
control of an engine in a test cell.
This DIA concept, referred to as Revision 2 in the previous contract [g],
operated as follows. In the case of no sensor failures, the outputs of the
normal mode filter were fed to the proportional control part and the sensed
outputs (Nl and PT6 only) were fed to the integral control. This ensured that
in steady state, the engine outputs were at the reference point, i.e., there
were no steady-state hang-off errors. In the case of a failure, the
synthesized value of the outputs were fed to both the proportional and
integral controls. Note that if the failed sensor is N1 or PT6, the integral
logic ensured that the estimates of these measurements were driven to the
reference point. A detailed block diagram of the overall system is shown in
Figure 1.6.
The form of the control law, as shown in Figure 1.6, is given by:
No Failure:
u = ub _ Cp(Zp - zpb ) + Clf(z I - Zlb ) dt (1.2)
Failure:
f-u = u b _ Cp(Zp - zpb ) + CI (z I - ZIb) dt (1.3)
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The symbols ar.e the same as in (1.I). Note that the estimates are being used
in the integral trim portion after failure isolation.
As part of the revision evaluation process, SCT:
(I) generated new gain matrices for both the normal and failure
mode filters used in the DIA algorithm;
(2) defined a minimum complexity DIA algorithm;
(3) examined estimator gain sensitivity to flight condition; and
(4) developed the revisions for correcting the bias problem in the
estimator outputs.
As a result of this study, the advanced DIA technique (Revision 2) was
shown to have improved performance over the technique chosen in the first
program. However, model errors limited the performance of the estimators and
made determination of detection and isolation thresholds difficult. The
present study attempts to alleviate these problems.
The scope of the present research effort is to develop an analytic
u_derstanding of the problems by applying the tools of robust multivariable
control theory to accommodate modeling errors.
1.3.2 The Fundamental Issue: Model Uncertainty
The previous section has identified model uncertainty as the main source
of problems in sensor DIA algorithm design. Model (system, plant) uncertainty
refers to the uncertainty in the errors between the nominal model and the
actual system. There are two generic uncertainty representations: structured
and unstructured [13]. The former refers to model parameters which are
uncertain. The latter refers to unmodeled dynamics which are also uncertain.
Reduced-order modeling techniques, linearization about operating points,
neglecting nonlinearities, etc., all result in contributions to either
structured or unstructured uncertainty. Figure 1.7 illustrates how
uncertainties can appear in a control system which includes sensor failure DIA
16
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logic. The "blocks" represent fixed devices or processors. The "clouds"
represent the system uncertainty and can be broadly grouped into two classes:
(1) uncertain (external) inputs
r - reference commands
d - environmental disturbances
b - biases or drifts in a failed sensor
(2) uncertain (internal) dynamics, defined by the Following
transfer function matrices:
AM(S) - plant model errors
as(S) - sensor failures
Ac(S), BE(S) - control law and estimator reconfigurations from
DIA
Since model uncertainty is the source of most difficulties, an approach
is needed to deal with it in an effective manner. Robust DIA design provides
a means to do this.
1.4 METHOD OF APPROACH
The method of approach developed in this report is to use robust control
theory for threshold selector analysis and robust DIA filter design (as
described in Section 1.2). This requires the isolation of uncertainties as
shown in Figure l.?. The approach establishes quantitative statements about
the interrelation among performance, robustness, and system uncertainty.
Figure 1.8 illustrates how all the uncertainties can be separately grouped for
analysis. The external inputs, such as commands, disturbances, and failure
biases, enter the system From the "outside." The dynamic uncertainties, such
as model errors, sensor failures, and DIA reconfigurations, are "inside" the
system and function as a feedback loop around the "interconnection" system.
The interconnection system maps the external and internal uncertainties into
the outputs, i.e. tracking error and filter residuals.
18
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Upuntil recent years, there has been no unified control design approach
for such a system as shown in Figure 1.8. Researchefforts [13-15], which are
elaborations on the Small Gain Theorem[16,17] have established the
mathematical framework For such an approach. Basically, the dynamic uncertain-
ties (AM, aS, aC, 8E) all propagate in a specific way so as to cause a
quantifiable uncertainty about the mapFromthe inputs (r,d,b) into the
outputs (e,y), provided bounds can be found for the dynamic uncertainties.
These boundsare obtainable from simple input/output system tests.
Furthermore, if the nominal system model is linear, the boundsand subsequent
input/output errors are fully representable in the Frequency domain. For
example, the effect of all dynamic uncertainties on the tracking error and the
filter residuals can be represented by simple graphs. For good tracking with
no sensor failures, the error response and the filter residuals should be
small over all frequencies. On the other hand, if a failure occurs -- either
a bias/drift b or structure change AS -- then the filter residual
frequency signature should be dramatically different from the normal
(unfailed) mode. Otherwise, detection is not possible.
The approach _til!zes the Following recent advances [13-20] in control
theory:
(1) Uncertainty Propagation [15]
The dynamic uncertainties, as shown in Figure 1.8, can be bounded in
a sector in the Frequency domain which then propagates through the
interconnection system so that the system input/output map is also in a sector
in the frequency domain. These sectors determine quantitatively the
performance/robustness trade.
(2) Internal Model Principle [IB]
The principle states that asymptotic tracking and disturbance
rejection in the presence of plant uncertainty can only be achieved if the
controlled system contains a replica (internal model) of the commands and
disturbance signal generators. For example, tracking constant commands
requires integrators in the loop.
20
These control design advances, together with methods for frequency-shaped
LQG[26] allow for design of either the DIA logic or control/estimator
directly in the frequency domain. Thus, if detection is desired for a
particular failure, the compensation required can be seen in the Frequency
domain exactly. Simultaneously, one can determine the effect of the new
compensation on tracking performance. A similar procedure can be used for
adaptive design.
These ideas are illustrated in the flowchart of Figure 1.9, which shows
how the tools generated from the method of approach can be used in a design
process. Notice that the mode]ing errors combine with the sensor failures and
the errors from DIA reconfiguratlons to Form the system dynamic uncertainty.
It is possible to determine a bound on this uncertainty. The control system
(estimator/control law/DIA logic) is then evaluated in the frequency domain by
propagating the dynamic uncertainty as outlined above. The evaluation process
yields quantitative results which suggest how to modify or robustify the
design. This is an iterative process.
.r
Notice that there are three levels of design. Constant gain DIA filters
provide a "first cut" design. Optimal thresholds for these filters can be
determined as well as minimum size of detectable failures (Level l). Note
that these computations are a function of bound on model error, noise, and
class of Failures. If a higher level of performance is required, a robust DIA
design can be carried out as shown in the flowchart (Level 2). Still better
performance is possible by making the DIA filters adaptive (Level 3).
1.5 OUTLINE OF REPORT
This chapter has discussed the background and problem statement for this
research effort. Current technology approaches were reviewed. The
fundamental problem to be dealt with in DIA logic design, to achieve better
performance, has been identified as model uncertainty. The proposed solution
has been discussed at a high level. The rest of this report contains the
technical details of the method of approach.
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Figure 1.9 Design Approach
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Chapter II discusses the effect of model uncertainty on stability and
performance. Both stability and newperformance robustness measuresare
developed. The performance robustness measuresare with respect to tracking
and disturbance rejection properties of the system. The effect of model
uncertainty on asymptotic tracking capability is discussed. It is pointed out
that for adequate asymptotic performance, an internal model is necessary.
This creates certain so-called "structurally robust blocking zeros" to
guarantee asymptotic performance.
Chapter Ill discusses the effect of model uncertainty on sensor failure
DIA. The fundamental concept of the threshold selector is introduced. This
represents a new, innovative tool for the analysis and synthesis of DIA
algorithms. The threshold selector concept is illustrated both for a scalar
example and for a model of a multivariable turbofan jet engine. A closed-form
solution has been obtained for the scalar case, and a computer-aided design
(CAD) approach was developed to solve the multivariable case.
Chapter IV discusses the design of robust filters for sensor failure
DIA. The robustness of the Filter _s ,_ue to the presence of an internal model
(as discussed in Chapter II) and due to the frequency-shaplng of an LQG cost
functional. The formulation and mathematical details of the frequency-shaped
filters are discussed in this chapter. Results from an example using a
dynamic simulation of a turbofan jet engine are presented.
Chapter V presents the results of an evaluation study comparing the
performance of the proposed robust DIA scheme to one of the schemes developed
in Ref. g. It is found that the performance of the two techniques is similar
For hard Failures, but the proposed scheme shows considerable improvement in
the case of soft failures.
Chapter VI provides some concluding remarks and directions for future
research.
Appendix A discusses model uncertainty and contains a procedure along
wlth results for generation of a bound on model error for a jet engine.
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1.6 REMARKSONNOTATION
Standard notation from control theory literature has been used whenever
possible. For example, time domainquantities are usually denoted by lower
case, whereas the samequantity in the frequency domain has been denoted by
upper case. However, there are several exceptions. Lower case b(t) is used
to denote a bias in the time domainand b(s) denotes the samequantity in
the frequency, and similarly for _(t) and v(s). There are other
exceptions that are generally clear from the context.
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II. MODELUNCERTAINTYANDITS EFFECTONSTABILITYANDPERFORMANCE
Model uncertainty is the main problem in DIA algorithm design as
discussed in Chapter I. Howmodel uncertainty manifests itself affects what
one can do to achieve a high performance DIA algorithm. Hence, its effects on
stability and performance need to be studied before addressing its effects on
detection and robust filter design (to be discussed in Chapters Ill and IV,
respectively. This chapter discusses the sources of model uncertainty in
dynamic systems. Both unstructured and parameter uncertainty are considered.
Detai}s on model uncertainty and a procedure for computation of its bound for
a jet engine example are contained in Appendix A. This chapter concentrates
on the effects of model uncertainty on stability and performance properties of
the system. New measures are defined for performance robustness analysis
which are similar to the well-known stability robustness measures [13]. The
effect of model error on asymptotic tracking is explored. It is shown that an
internal model is required in the DIA filter to eliminate the effect of the
biases on the outputs of the system asymptotically. The inclusion of the
internal model results in creation of certain structurally robust blocking
transmission zeros to guarantee robustness.
2.1 MODEL UNCERTAINTY
A very natural way to determine model uncertainty is to perform an
experiment which compares the model with data From the actual system (plant).
If there is no error between the model and the plant, then one has perfect
knowledge of the plant. Normally, this is not the situation -- the error is
non-zero and represents how close the model is to the plant. For example,
consider the simple experiment depicted in Figure 2.1(a), where e is the
error between the perturbation output _Yp = Y - Yo from the actual
plant and the corresponding output _Ym of the linearized model; 6u
is the perturbation input to both the plant and linearized model. Po(S) is
a transfer function matrix description of the model.
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Figure 2.1 Experiment to Determine Model Uncertainty
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By applying sinusoidal test inputs, one can experimentally obtain a
frequency-dependent boundas shownin Figure 2.1(b). Often, a good model will
be accurate at a certain frequency range, small _(_)*, and less accurate
at other frequencies, large 6(w). Figure 2.1(b) is characteristic of
unmodeled high-frequency phenomena, incorrectly modeled parameters, as well as
some types of neglected nonlinearities. For jet engine models, the key
problem is "DC mismatch," i.e. non-zero error at low frequency. This is the
predominant cause of setpoint "hang-off" and estimator bias.
Sources of this type of uncertainty may be quite diverse. Slowly
drifting parameters in an otherwise perfectly known linear time invariant
(LTI) plant could wield the same uncertainty description as a plant with
unknown nonlinearities approximated by an LTI model.** The key feature of
this uncertainty is that, although it is bounded, one does not know the
structure. Following Ref. 2, this is called the unstructured uncertainty of
the model P (s). Essentially, the unstructured uncertainty indicates the
o
accuracy of the model in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. Equivalently,
the plant input/output behavior in the neighborhood of the equilibrium can be
described by the linearized uncertain model
Pm(S) = (I _ a(s))Po(S) (2.1)
where a(s) is the LTI unstructured output-multiplicative uncertainty
operator with transfer function matrix A(S). All that is known about
a(s) is that it is stable, causal, and bounded by
_[a(j_)] < a(_), _ >0 (2.2)
where _(-) denotes the maximum (upper) singular value.
* 6(_) representing mode] error is not to be confused with perturbation
quantities such as _Yp, 6Ym, etc.
** To reflect parameter errors in a(_) may require a very large number of
experiments as shown in Figure 2.1(a).
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In a general way, unstructured uncertainties account for all neglected
dynamics, approximated nonlinearities, etc.
Onefurther remark about the uncertain linearized model Pm(S). For
every input/output pair (u, y) which satisfies
Y(s) = P(s) U(s) (2.3)
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium, there exists a Pm(S)
(equivalently, a a(s)) such that Y(s) = P(s) U(s). One way to view this
is to imagine that a(s) contains a sufficiently large (theoretically
infinite) number of adjustable parameters so that any input/output can be
perfectly matched. The bound on a(s) in (2.2) conveys the worst case
situation. Note that a(s) can be infinite dimensional, without loss of
generality.
Parameter Uncertainty
Modeling of plant uncertainty by the description given in (2.1) and (2.2)
will be used throughout. A state-space linear plant model is assumed to be
given by
= AoX + BoU (2.4)
y=Cx+Du
0 0
with a corresponding model transfer function matrix
-l
Po(S) = Co(Sl - Ao) Bo ÷ DO (2.5)
This model is valid only for input/output behavior restricted to a
neighborhood of the equilibrium point. A new equilibrium point will have a
different nominal model, i.e., the parameters in P (s) will change as a
o
Function of the equilibrium. This is easily seen in the definition of
Po(S) given by (2.5). In a general way, one can consider the nominal model
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to be a parametric model, where the parameters are adjusted to best fit the
input/output data.
For example, let P (s) denote a parametric model of an uncertain
plant P(s), where _ is a k-vector of parameters in the model. Standard
Rkparameter identification methodscan be used to find the best _ c to
fit the data from the actual plant. For example, given plant input/output
(u, y) on the interval t c[O, T_, a good parametric model is founddata
from
inf IIy - YallT (2.6)
:cR k
where
suitable norm, such as the L2 norm
(/o )UxHT = x'(t) x(t) dt I/2
The perfect matching condition
Y (s) = P (s) U(s)
inf denotes the greatest lower bound or infimum and II.II is a
(2.7)
(2.8)
for some a and all (u, y) is never achieved for models of actual systems.
The usual situation is the opposite. In fact, there is usually a range of
which solve (2.6).
The variations in _ can be considered as uncertain parameters in the
model. Since these parameters enter into the model in a definite manner, they
can be referred to as the structured uncertainty of the model [13-15]. In a
general way, unstructured uncertainties account for all neglected dynamics,
approximated nonlinearities, etc. The structured uncertainty essentially
yields the range of parameter variation in the model for a best fit of the
data.
Parameter (or structured) uncertainties can also be viewed in a slightly
different way. Consider the system
2g
= + 6A)x ÷ (B + _B)u(Ao o
y= C x
0
where (Ao, Bo, CO) are the nominal system matrices and
represents a perturbation in the system parameters.
(6A, 6B) are known to be bounded such that
(2.9)
(_A, 6B)
Suppose further that
;(6A) C a, ;(6B) _ b (2.10)
Following the procedures developed in Refs. 4 and 5, one can construct bounds
which inc]ude these parameter perturbations. Such a construction is useful
when analyzing the effect of specific parameter uncertainties. Bounds on
model error constructed in this way account for the type of uncertainties
discussed by Leininger [4].
2.2 EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON STABILITY AND PERFORMANCE
The model uncertainty discussed in the previous section has significant
effects on both stability and performance of the system under feedback
control. This section establishes quantitative trade-offs between uncertainty
and stability, as well as performance. For this purpose, generic DIA
configurations need to be considered for analysis and design purposes. In
previous programs [8, g], an estimator was designed as part of the DIA logic
to provide synthesized estimates of system outputs. The estimator may operate
both as part of the Feedback loop or out of the feedback loop.
Consider the two generic candidate design schemes shown in Figures 2.2
and 2.3. The design in Figure 2.2, referred to as DIA l, shows a feedback
control system with an estimator running out of the control loop, i.e.,
"piggyback." The design in Figure 2.3, referred to as DIA 2, shows the
estimator running in the loop. In both cases, the estimators contain the
nominal plant model Po(S), which approximates the actual plant Pm(S),
and a dynamic Filter gain F(s), such that
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Y(s) : Po(S)U(s) + F(s)v(s) (2.11)
A
v(t) = z(t) - y(t) (2.12)
z(t) = b(t) + y(t) (2.13)
where y(t) is the estimate of the output y(t), v(t) is the innovations
signal, and z(t) is the sensor output, which is composed of the engine
output y and a bias signal b(t) which represents both sensor noise and a
class of sensor failures. The estimator structure (2.11) is equivalent to the
usual state space structure for estimators/observers, where
x = Ax ÷ Bu ÷ Kv(t), v(t) = y(t) - y(t)
y = Cx + Du
In this case, the nominal plant model and filter are, respectively:
(2.14)
(2.15)
-l
Po(S) = C(sI - A) B + D (2.16)
-l
F(s) = C(sI-A) K (2.17)
The control signal is given by
U(s) : i Gc(S)(R(s)-Z(s))' D[Al
I Gc(S)(R(s)-Y(s)) DIA 2
(2.18)
(2.19)
where R is the reference command and G (s)
c
function.
is the controller transfer
Both of these designs capture the significant characteristics of current
DIA schemes as well as being general enough to account for a large class of
alternate DIA schemes. For example, DIA 1 is representative of either:
(i)
(2)
a nominal (no Failure) controller with DIA logic based on a
"piggyback" estimator; or
a reconfigured system where Gc(s ) is a controller/estimator
combination with an estimator out of the loop for further DIA
action.
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Note that in (I) and (2) above, the out-of-loop estimator need not be the
same. Similarly, DIA 2 is representative of either:
(3) a nominal (no failure) system where the DIA logic is based on
an estimator in the loop; or
(4) a reconfigured system where the DIA logic is based on the
estimator in the loop.
As in (1) and (2), the estimators in (3) and (4) need not be identical.
2.2.1 {ffect of Model Error on Stability
In this section, tools are developed for determining the effect of
uncertainty on stability of DIAl and DIA 2. It will be assumed here that the
plant is represented by
Pm(S) = (I + a(s)) Po(S)
with
(2.20)
_[A(j_)] < a(_) , _ > 0 (2.21)
where P (s) is the nominal engine model obtained by linearization about an
o
equilibrium and a(s) is the unstructured model uncertainty.
In order to analyze the systems, it is necessary to determine the
transfer functions defined implicitly by,
E(s) = HerR(S) + Heb(S)b(s) (2.22)
u(s) = Hvr(S)R(s) ÷ Hvb(S)b(s) (2.23)
The most convenient way to do this is via the "interconnection" structure
where the uncertainty a(s)
= er
s) H r
is isolated [15] as shown in Figure 2.4,
H b b(s)
(2.24)
33
rd H
INTERCONNECTION
b SYSTEM
e - r - y
lJ- TRACXING ERROR
A
• y - J
RESIOUALS
Figure 2.4 Fault-Tolerant System (with Separately Grouped Uncertainties)
34
A more detailed discussion of the interconnection system is provided in the
next section. For DIA l, one gets (suppress the 's' variable)
-l
Her = S(I + AT)
-I
Heb = T + S(l + AT) AT (2.25)
-l
H : L(I + AT) AT
_r
-l
Hvb = L(I + AT)
and likewise for DIA 2, one gets
H
er
-l
= S - S(I + GL)(I + ATM) AT
Heb = TM + S(I + GL)(I + ATM) ATM (2.z6)
-l
H = L(I + ATM) AT
vr
-I
H b = L(I + ATM)
where
G=PG
O C
-l -l
S = (I + G) , T = (I + G) G (2.27)
-I -I
L = (I + F) , M : (I + F) F
The transfer functions (2.25) and (2.26) are stable if
(1) S, T, M, and L are stable
(2) _£(_)_[T(j_)] < l, _ >_0 (2.28)
(3) &(_)_[T(J_)M(J_)] < I, _ _ 0
Consider the Following scalar example, where
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a a
Po(s) = _s+a' Gc(S) = 1 +-s (2.29)
kF(s) = _ (2.30)
s+a
and From (2.27),
a sG,= S =_s ' s+a '
a
T : s+a (2 31)
s+a k
L = M=
s+a+k ' s+a+k
Consequently, conditions (2) and (3) above yield the following model error
bounds-
, _ >_0 (2.32)
( °) + ( ) , _>0
The above bounds can be interpreted as the maximum permissible bounds on
model error for which the system (DIAl or DIA 2) remains stable. For
example, if the actual model error is predominantly DC mismatch where the DC
gain is known to within ±lO percent, i.e., _ = .l, then the above is
certainly satisfied.
2.2.2 Effect of Model Error on Performance: Performance Robustness
Performance refers to the behavior of the system in relation to specified
objectives, such as transient response, command following, and disturbance
rejection. Performance robustness is the ability of the feedback system to
maintain a performance specification despite plant uncertainty. In order to
realize such robustness properties of feedback, it is necessary to establish
quantitatively the trade-offs and relationships among performance, robustness,
and plant uncertainty. Presented below is a method for directly analyzing
performance robustness of uncertain multivariable systems.
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2.2.3 Conic Sectors
Structured and unstructured uncertainties can both be viewed as belonging
to an Lp-conic sector, defined as follows [15]:
Definition: A relation (u, y) c H is _nside the L -conic sector,
P
denoted H c L -Cone (C, R, S) if For some p c [l, ®] there exists
P
compatible operators C, R, and S such that H - C is L -stable* and
P
ItS(y - Cu), < nRull For all (u, y) c L x L with y ¢ Hu.
p- p P P
In the case of L2-stable LTI operators R, S, and H-C with transfer
function matrices R(s), S(s), and H(s)-C(s), respectively, the L2-conic
sector is equivalent to the frequency-domain condition,
7[S(jw)(H(j_)-C(j_))R-I(jw)] _ l, -_w (2.33)
Let _ = diag (:l "" °k) be a diagonal matrix containing all the
structured uncertainties. Equivalent statements for plant uncertainty with the LTI
model P [_] of P is that the structured uncertainty _ c L2-cone (0, B I_m _ s,
where B = diag (Bl ... Bk) and the unstructured uncertainty r ¢ L2-cone (0,
I, I). Thus, conic sectors conveniently describe typical model (plant) uncertainty.
2.2.4 Plant Interconnection Model
It is convenient to represent the uncertain plant as shown in Figure 2.5,
which is patterned after the uncertain system descriptions presented in
Ref. 15. The operator
(oo)A = (2.34)
0 F
* A relation H is said to be L -stable if for all u c L , y c Hu c L ,
P P P
and there exists finite positive constant k such that llyllp_< kllUllp.
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contains all the uncertainties in the plant -- both structured and
unstructured. The operator H is referred to as the plant interconnection
system and serves to isolate all the uncertainties in A from the rest of
the plant. Consequently, H is completely known. The governing plant
equations are then
(y)(u)(HH)(u)= H -- yu yv
Z V HZU HZV v
(2.35)
v = AZ (2.36)
The plant input/output relation is given by
y = P[a]u
with
-l
P[A] = P + H (I - AH ) AH
0 yV ZV ZU
where P is the nominal plant defined by
0
P = PEA] = H
o a:O yu
The uncertainty a can also be viewed as belonging to a conic sector,
i.e. a c L2-Cone (0, R, I), R = diag(B, I) which implies the conic
sector descriptions of the uncertainties of _ and r. The plant
representation shown in Figure 2.5 is extremely useful in evaluating
performance of the closed-loop system. With an LTI model, the conic-sector
bound on _ is equivalent to the Frequency-domain condition,
(2.37)
(2.38)
(2.39)
_[a(J_)R-l(J_)] ! l, R(j_) = diag(B, _(_)I) (2.40)
2.2.5 Normalization
-l
AR
The uncertainty and interconnection system can be normalized. Let
replace A, RHzv replace Hzv, and RHzu replace
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Hzu. P[a] nowhas the sameform as before, but 8 is normalized so
that
8 c L -cone (0, I, I)P
For convenience, assumethat henceforth these replacements have been madeand
the plant interconnection system is normalized.
2.2.6 Performance Robustness Measures
Consider the feedback system shown in Figure 2.6. The plant has the
transfer function
P(A) = Po(S) (I + 8(s)) (2.41)
where Po(S) is the nominal plant transfer function and
the unstructured input-multiplicative uncertainty. P (s)
o
terms of state variable matrices is
-l
P (s) = C(sl-A) B _ D
o
The closed-loop interconnection system is
IY = I HYR(s) Hvd(s) Hyv(S) 1
z LHzR(s) Hzd(s) Hzv(S)j IRId
V
where for a unity feedback system ("suppressing" s)
-I
HyR = (I . Po Gc) Po Gc
-I
Hyv : (I ÷ Po Gc) Po
-I
HZV : - (I _-G c Po) Gc Po
-I
HZR = ([ + Gc Po) Gc
a(s) represents
expressed in
(2.42)
(2.43)
(2.44)
(2.45)
(2.46)
(2.47)
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Now assume that the tracking performance requirements are expressed in the
frequency domain in terms of
ItHyR(8) - HyRII
IIHyRII
< p(=) ,.,>_0 (2.48)
where HyR is the nominal input-output transfer function, HyR(A) is
the perturbed input-output transfer function and p(_) represents some
given function of frequency which specifies tolerable tracking performance
degradation. Furthermore, if 6(_) represents a bound on model
uncertainty, i.e.
tIall< 6(=) _ >_0 (2.49)
then the tracking performance robustness properties of the system is described
by the Following theorem.
Theorem 2.1" Assume that the tracking performance requirements are
expressed by (2.48) and the closed-loop interconnection system is stable.
Then tracking performance requirements are guaranteed if
_PRT(_) > 6(_) _ _ 0
where
(2.50)
_PRT(W) =
p(w) _(HyR)
a(Hzv)a(HyR)p(w) _ a(Hyv)o(HzR)
(2.51)
is the tracking performance robustness measure.
Proof" Assuming d = O,
-l
HyR(A) = HyR ÷ Hyv(I - aHzv) A HZR
Substituting (2.52) Into (2.48), one obtains
-l
IIHyv(I - AHzv) 8 HZRII _ p(_) IIHyRII
from Eqs. (2.38) and (2.43), it follows that
(2.52)
(2.53)
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Using the matrix inequalities
_(AB) > _(A) £(B) (2.54)
_(I - C) _ l - _(C) if _(C) < l (2.55)
l
__(A) - _(A- l)
(2.56)
then it follows from (2.53) that
o(Hyv) a _(HzR)
1 - & ,_(Hzv)
p(_) _(HyR) (2.57)
Solving for the worst-case value of a in (2.57) and naming the particular
value satisfying (2.57) 6pR T we have
_pR T =
p(_) _(HyR)
_(Hzv)_(HyR)p(_) + ;(Hyv)_(HzR)
(2.58)
Therefore, so long as
< SpR T
(2.59)
then (2.57) is satisfied and the tracking performance robustness is guaran-
teed. Q.E.D.
Suppose that the disturbance rejection performance robustness is
expressed as
IIYII< B(_) _ >_.0 (2.60)
where _(_) describes the allowable disturbance rejection performance
degradation. The following theorem describes the performance robustness
properties of the system.
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Theorem 7.2: Assume that the disturbance rejection requirements are
expressed by (2.60) and the closed-loop interconnection system is stable.
Then the disturbance rejection performance robustness is guaranteed if
_PRD(_) > _(_) _ _ 0 (2.61)
where
B - _(Hyd)
= (2.62)
6PRD(W) _(Hzv)(8__(Hyd) ) +-o(Hyv)_(Hzd)
is the disturbance rejection performance measure.
Proof: Assuming R = O, from (2.36) and (2.43) it follows that
-l
Hyd(A) = Hyd + HyvA(I - HZVA) Hzd (2.63)
and
-l
lIHyd + Hyva(I - HZVA) Hzdll < (] (2.64)
Using the matrix inequalities (2.54) through (2.56), the above equation can be
written as
;(Hyd)(1 - ;(Hzv) _) + ;(Hyv) & ;(Hzd)
1 - 6 ;(Hzv)
< (] (2.65)
Solving for the worst-case value of
we obtain
from (2.65) and naming it 6 (e)
PRD
6pR (w) =
D
8 - o(Hyd)
_(Hzv)(B - _(Hyd)) + _(Hyv)_(Hzd)
(2.66)
Then, so long as
< &pR D
(2.67)
(2.65) is satisfied and the disturbance rejection performance robustness is
guaranteed. Q.E.D.
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The stability robustness measure for the system is given by [13]:
l
_SR(_) -
_(Hzv)
and the system is stable provided that
(2.68)
6SR(W ) > _(_) (2.69)
It is easy to see that
_PRT(_ ) < 6SR(_) _ _ 0 (2.?0)
> 0 (2.71)
_PRo(_) < _SR(_)
Figure 2.? shows the stability and performance robustness measures for a
fifth-order multivariable system for 5% performance degradation from nominal.
These measures then establish how accurate the plant model has to be for
specified performance as a function of frequency. Note that various
controller designs can be evaluated on the basis of these measures.
2.2.7 Effect of Model Error on Asymptotic Trackinq
The discussion to Follow will illustrate the internal model, principle
[18], namely that, design of robust filters (and controllers) to achieve
asvmptotic tracking and disturbance rejection, despite model error, can only
be accomplished if a model of the command and disturbance is incorporated in
the filter (controller). It is shown that the inclusion of the internal model
creates appropriate structurally robust blocking zeros.
The critical performance measure for engine control is the ability to
achieve asymptotic tracking despite model error at DC. This section
highlights some of the main issues associated with this problem.
In order to evaluate the effect of model error on asymptotic tracking,
assume that the following conditions hold:
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(I) The model error satisfies (2.28), i.e., the system is stable.
(2) The reference r(t) _ rss (constant) as t _ -.
(3) There is no sensor failure, i.e., b = O.
These conditions, together with (2.31), yield the following steady-state
signals for DIAl (estimator out of loop):
e : 0 (2.72)
SS
-I
Hvr = L(I+AT) AT
s÷a a -l a (2.73)
= s+a+k (l + a _+a ) A s+a
v(s) = Hvr(S) R(s) (2.74)
aa(O)
Uss(S) : (a+k)(l+8(O)) Rss(S) (2.75)
Similarly, for DIA 2 (estimator in the loop)
v(s) : Hvr(S)R(s) (2.76)
H : L(I+ATM)-IAT (2.77)
_r
am(O) (2.78)
ess = -"ss = - a+k+ka(O) rss
This latter result exhibits the undesirable "hang-off" when the estimator is
in the loop, e.g., DIA 2. This problem can be eliminated if the filter in
DIA 2 contains an integrator, e.g., if F(s) in (2.30) has the form,
fl s +f 2 (2.79)
F(s) - s(s+f3 )
To see this, consider the plant and controller of (2.29) with F(s) as in
(2.79), then
a
G = -
s
a
T = -- (2.80)
s+a
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-I S(S+f3)
L : (I_F) : (2.81)
s(s+f3) + fls + f2
fls + f2
M = LF = (2.82)
s(s+f3) + fls + f2
For DIA 2
-l
H = L(I + ATM) AT (2.83)
vr
and
limH :0
vr (2.84)
s_O
It then follows that e : O.
SS
Internal Model Principle and Structurally Robust Blocking Zeros:
The internal model principle states that asymptotic tracking and
dic:_urbance rejection in the presence of plant uncertainty can only be
achieved if the controlled system contains a replica (internal model) of the
commands and disturbance signal generators [18-20]. For example, tracking
constant commands and rejection of constant disturbances requires integrators
in the loop. The presence of the internal model creates zeros of transmission
in certain transfer functions. For instance, for command following, transmis-
sion zeros are created between the reference input and the tracking error at
the frequencies of the commanded signal. These zeros referred to as
"blocking" zeros, are also structurally robust, i.e., the locations of the
zeros are unaffected by parameter variations.
For sensor failure DIA systems, if the plant's steady-state output is to
be unaffected by a failure (represented by the bias b), then the transfer
function from b to u (and therefore y) must contain a structurally robust
blocking zero. This would happen if an internal model is present in the
filter. The following examples illustrates this.
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Example 2.1 SISO System with Unknown Measurement Bias:
Consider the SISO plant
a
Po(s) = s+a
with the filter containing the internal model
Plant:
(2.85)
= -ax + au
y = x
z=y÷b
A
Filter: x = -ax ÷ Kl(Z - z) ÷ au
A
b = K2(z - z)
Z = X ÷ b
Control law:
(2.86)
(2.87)
u = -K x
o
(2.88)
Then substitution of the control law in the system equations results in the
overall system equations from the bias to the control
m
x
b
-a-Kl-aK o -Kl Kl= -K2 -K2 K2
-aK 0 -a
o
x_ I K1
b I + K2
.xJ .o J
u = -[Ko 0 ] (2.89)
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For a linear tlme-lnvariant system of the form
x = Ax ÷ BU
y = Cx + Du
(2.9o)
the transmission zeros are defined as those frequencies at which the system
matrix (pencil)
[ ]sI-A I BXZ(s) = ,',
-C : -D
I
loses rank [22].
(2.91)'
The zeros from b to u are given by
yz(S) = det
m
s+a+Kl+aK o K1 -K 1
K2 s+K 2 -K 2
aK 0 s÷a
o
K 0 0
o
n
K1
K2
0
0
- 0
= -KoK1s(s,a) (2.92)
i.e., there is a zero at the origin. Furthermore, this zero is structurally
robus!, i.e., its location does not change in spite of the parameter errors in
the system matrices. To see this, assume that the system matrices are modified
such that
Po (s) : _s+a+c (2.93)
where _ and B represent plant parameter variations of any size so long
as the closed-loop system remains stable.
The overall system equations from b to u are now given by
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RX
b
_m
(-a-aKo-K l)
= -K2
-(a+B)K o
u = [-Ko 0 O]
yz(S) = det
The zeros are
-KI
-K2
0
K1
K2
-(a+_)
i x K1
I b + K2 b
i
!x o
L_-__ ----
s+a+aKo+K l
K2
(a+B)K
0
Kl
s+K2
0
_K1 I KI--[
-K2 J K_
s+a+c I 0
I
K 0
0
o I o
I
: -KiK2s(s-a-c )
- 0
(2.94)
(2.95)
which confirms the fact that the zero at s=O _s unaffected by parameter
variations hence the robustness property.
Example 2.2 Multlvariable System with Unknown Constant Measurement Bias:
Plant:
Filter:
Consider the general square multivariable system
x : Ax + Bu
y=Cx
Z =y÷b
x = Ax + Bu ÷ KI(Z-Z), y = Cx
z=y+b
b = Kz(Z-Z)
(2.96)
(2.9?)
(2.98)
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AControl law: u = -K x
O (2.99)
w
! I
x I
Jl I
b t;
• I
X I
The overall system equations are
A-BKo-KIC -K 1
-K2C -K 2
-BK o 0
X
u = [-Ko 0 O]
KIC
K2C
A
_ m m
r x Kl
!
b + K2
x 0
The transmission zeros of the system are given by
(2.100)
yz(S) = det
w
sI-A+BKo+KIC K1 -KIC
K2C sI+K 2 -K2C
-B K 0 sI-A
0
-K 0 0
0
-K,
-K 2
0
0
: 0 (2.101)
which after elementary row and column operations is equivalent to
yz(S) = det
m
sI-A _K1 a I 0 ''Ii 1 i
i o I
-K 0 I I 0
o I I i
0 0 -I sI-A I 0 '
I
I I- -
i o I sI'0 -K 2
(2.102)
which shows the presence of blocking zeros at the origin. To see that these
transmission zeros are structurally robust, consider the parameter and
controller perturbations
= A + aA (2.103)
B:B+_B (2.104)
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Ko = Ko÷ &Ko (2.105)
K1 = K1 ÷ _K1 (2.lO6)
K2 = K2 + &K2
The transmission zeros of the perturbed system are given by
_z(S) =
m
sI-R -KI
-[ 0
0
0 0
0 -K'_
0 I 0
ol o
s_-_ I o
0 I sl
I
(2.107)
(2.108)
which confirms the fact that the transmission zeros at the origin are
structurally robust as they are not affected by plant parameter variations.
The above development can also be carried out for systems wi_h a non-zero
direct transmission term (O # O) and with more complicated dynamics for the
bias b. The conclusions would be the same.
2.3 SUMMARY
In thls chapter, we have discussed various sources of model uncertainty
and its representation. The effects of model uncertainty on stability and
performance was discussed for two generic configurations. New performance
robustness measures were introduced to determine tracking and disturbance
rejection performance robustness properties. The effects of modeling errors
on asymptotic tracking were discussed. It was shown that an internal model is
required in the filter to produce unbiased estimates.
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Ill. EFFECTOFMODELUNCERTAINTYONFAILUREDETECTION:
THETHRESHOLDSELECTOR
Oneof the most difficult problems in sensor failure DIA algorithm design
is the ability to evaluate analytically the DIA algorithm in the presence of
model error. In this section, for the first time, a unified framework which
allows for this analysis is presented. A new concept is introduced, referred
to as the threshold selector, which is a nonlinear inequality whose solution
defines the set of detectable sensor failure signals. The threshold selector
is consistent with the frequency domain model uncertainty description that has
been emphasized in this study. What follows is a heuristic discussion of
failure detection which leads to the notion of the threshold selector. For
illustrative purposes, the Focus will be on the innovations approach to
failure detection. As will be seen, the methodology is quite general and not
limited to just the innovations approach. The conventional technique of
selecting thresholds in innovations-based DIA filters has been based on
noise. In a previous study [g], constant thresholds were selected based on a
•easur_ of innova_:ons size obtained from a no Failure hypothesis filter.
However, _he current technique determines thresholds based on model error,
sensor noise, and class of Failures, as _ell as the speed of the DIA Filters.
The threshold selector inequality to be presented here represents a new
and innovative tool in the analysis and synthesis of DIA algorithms. In
particular, good estimates for the minimum threshold set are obtained in the
multivariable case. In this case, it is necessary to compute operator gains
dependent upon the norm measure used in detection. DIA designs, more sophis-
ticated than those illustrated here, can also be analyzed and synthesized
using the threshold selector inequality.
3.1 INNOVATIONS APPROACH TO FAILURE DETECTION
_any ;ensor Failure detection schemes (for example, see Refs. I, 8 and g)
have been based on determining the characteristics, such as the RMS value, of
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the innovations v(t), over a given Finite time interval t c[O, T]. In
this section, a Frameworkwill be presented within which it is possible to
evaluate directly the effect of model uncertainty on the ability to detect a
failure. The analysis presented also proves to be extremely valuable in the
selection of the DIA estimator.
The problem Formulation is as in Chapter II.
sequencemaybe expressed as
_(s) = Hvb(S)b(s) + Hvr(S)R(s)
From (2.24), the innovation
where Hvband H are dependent on the model uncertainty A, and fromvr
(2.25) and (2.26),
Hvr(S) = Hvb(S)a(s)T(s )
Define the bias b as
(3.1)
(3.2)
b = n + F (3.3)
where n is zero-mean sensor noise and f is a drift signal associated '_ith a
class of sensor Failures. In practice, the situation is that a known class of
failures is possible, and detection is limited by some bounded noise signal
and bounded model error. Let _n' _f' and _a denote, respectively,
the bounded sets of noise signals n, Failure signals f, and model errors
a. Let J(T) denote a measure of the innovation size on the interval
0 < t < T, where J(_) is given by
J(T) = llvJlT (3.4)
The (truncated) norm operation II.Sl is based on an RMS measure of the
innovations and will be defined precisely below. The norm in Eq. (3.4) may be
evaluated either in the time domain or Frequency domain using Parseval's
theorem [28]. Hence, the notation
J(_) = !I_(s)I) (3.5)
T
k
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denotes evaluation in the frequency domain. Substituting (3.2) into (3.4)
gives
J(_) = llHvb(S)(N(s) + F(s) + W(s)T(s)R(s))II (3.6)
T
With no model error, 8 = 0 and
_(S) = H b(S)(N(s ) + F(s)) (3.7)
Thus, a non-zero bias due to sensor failure is detectable in y through the
dynamics of Hvb given by (2.26). Under mild constraints, it is possible
to detect the presence of failure for relatively small bias. The only limit
is due to noise levels in the sensor. However, the model error effectively
raises the detection threshold (3.6). It was Found in previous applications
of sensor failure DIA logic to the turbofan engine problem [8, 9] that the
model error considerably dominates any sensor noise level and is the primary
cause of false alarms and misses. What is sought is a means to detect the
presence of failure bias b despite model uncertainty A. More
specifically, what are the conditions of the transfer function matrices
H b and H r in (3.1) such that the _bility to detect a Failure is
maximized? Further, what is the most sensitive detection scheme for a known
class of failures?
3.1.1 False Alarm
A major requirement on detection is to reduce or prevent false alarms.
Thus, in the absence of any failure signal, J(T) should be less than a
threshold value, Jth" Setting f = 0 in (3.6) gives*
Jth(T) = sup llHvb(S)(N(s) + W(s)T(s)R(s))II (3.8)
T
For the sake of brevity, the notation sup(-)
x
for all x = n, f, A. Likewise, sup(.) means
×,y
is used in place of sup(.)
xc9
x
sup(,)
XC_x,Y¢_ x
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where sup(-) denote the supremum or the least upper bound. Note that the
threshold function Is dependent upon the known reference command r as well
as bounds on the noise and model errors. In fact, with no model errors,
a = 0 and the threshold is determined strictly by the worst-case noise
level, i.e.,
3th(T) = sup IIHvb(S)N(s)IIT (3.9)
n
3.1.2 The Threshold Selector
Setting a threshold to eliminate false alarms due to sensor noise and
model error will cause the detector to miss certain Failures. The question
is: What is the minimum detectable Failure? In other words, find the
threshold failure set. Denote this set by _f, which is defined as
those fc_f such that
inf J(T) > Jth(T)
A,n,f
(3.10)
where inf(.) denotes the infinum or the greatest lower bound. Substitut-
ing (3.6) and (3.8) into the above gives
inf
A,n,f
11Hvb(S)(N(s) + F(s) + A(s)T(s)R(s), > sup II_b (s)(N(s) + a(s)T(s)R(s)II
A,n T
(3.11)
If we decompose the innovations into components due to the noise, failure, and
error model
v(s) = Vn(S) + vf(s) + va(s) (3.12)
then (3.11) may be rewritten as
inf fly
n
A,n,f
+ v.1. + vAIIT > sup IlVn + vAIIT (3.13)
A,n
Since this inequality generates the minimum threshold set, it is referred to
as the threshold selector. An estimate of the smallest size of Failure f
which is detectable can now be calculated.
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Ifl
Theorem 3.1: An estimate of the size of minimum detectable failure
is given by
Ifl _ 2 Oth(T)/B(T) (3.14)
with the threshold as
Oth(T) __a(max _ [L(j_)]) n + 61rl_ L(QTI LT)(T)] (3.15)
and
B(t) _ ;[QTIL(T - tf)] (3.16)
A
Irl = norm of the reference input signal
A
Ill : norm of the failure signal
A
Q_k = operator gains which are functions of type of failure and
reference signals; k : i,j
A
= upper bound on mode] error (constant)
tf _ failure time
A
= size of detection window
_ bound on RMS sensor noise
Proof: A conservative estimate of the threshold set can be Found from
the inequality:
inf IIvf(S)ll T
F,A
since (3.17) implies (3.13).
(3.17) as
> 2 sup llVn(S) ÷ vA(S)IIT (3.17)
A,n
This can be seen as follows. We may rewrite
5B
,,,n(S ,,a(s)" >
(3.18)
and, since
sup JlVn(S) * va(s) II> inf ,Vn(S)+ _a(s),
a,n f,a
(3.]9)
(3.1B) may be written as
inf llvf(s)ll - inf llVn(S) + va(S)ll > sup llVn(S) ÷ va(s)llT T T
f,A 8,n A,n
(3.20)
However,
llvf(s) + Vn(S) + VA(S)II_ > lllvf(S)llT- llVn(S) + _a(s),TI
= llvf(s)tl_-llVn(S) + _A(S)IIT (3.21)
as long as
,_f(s),__ > ,_ (s) _ _ (s),n 8 (3.22)
SuDstituting (3.21) into (3.20), we have
inf It_n(S) + _f(s) + va(S)il
A,n,f
which is (3.13).
> sup 11Vn(S) + va(s)il
A,n
(3.23)
In order to utilize (3.13) or (3.14), it is necessary to specify the
detection measure if.Jr, and the sets _f _n and _ . Suppose thatT ' ' A
detection is based on the root mean square (RMS) measure,
llxll = (If0T 2dt)l
- Ix(t) l /2
T T
(3.24)
where Ix(t)] Is the Euclidean norm of x(t), i.e.,
I/2
Ix(t) l = (x'(t)x(t)) (3.25)
59
Furthermore, let
9f = {flf(t) = fol(t - tf), IfoI > f, tfc[O, T]}* i3.26)
= {nl IlnllT < n }
n
(3.27)
9a : {al;[a(j_)] _ a(_), _&o} (3.28)
In other words, the sensor failure signal f occurs at some time tfc[O,T];
and is represented by an abrupt shift in bias; the noise signal n is
arbitrary, except that it is bounded In norm (3.27); and the model error a
is bounded as described in (3.28). Note that by allowing the noise to be in
the set 9 , it is not possible to distinguish at each instant of time n
n
Cgn from f cgf. Therefore, it is necessary to view the innovations
over a (moving) time window T, e.g., as in (3.24). One can now calculate
an estimate of the smallest f in (3.26) by evaluating (3.13) over (3.17).
The mathematical machinery for this calculation is available [14-16], but
requires the introduction of the Following Jefinitions.
Let H denote an operator with proper rational transfer function matrix
H(s). Let rk denote the linear operator defined by
k= 0
k = 1,2 ....(rkH)(t) = _,-1 _ H(s) ,
s
(3.29)
-I
where _ [.] is the inverse Laplace transform operator. Thus,
corresponding to His), (roH)(t) is the impulse response matrix,
(rIH)(t) is the step response matrix, and so on. It is also convenient
to define the matrix operator,
* l(t) is the unit step function, i.e., lit ) = O, t < O; l(t) = I, t _ O.
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)(Q_kH)(T) : T [(rkH)(t)],[(rkH)(t)]dt I/2 (3.30)
With definitions (3.29) and (3.30), one can now calculate (3.17). In
order to facilitate the presentation here, we make the simplifying assumption
that the model error a is constant (e.g., DC model mlsmatch only) and is
sufficiently small so that
, -I -l
(I + AT) - I, (I + ATM) - I
or equivalently*
H b(S) = L(s)
From (3.17) it then follows that
inf,L(s)F(s), > 2 sup llL(s)N(s) + L(s)a(s)T(s)R(s),
T T
f,a a,n
We will now evaluate the above norms in the time domain. Using the relations
[28]
(3.31)
(3.32)
(3.33)
,I¢A,: )=I;JA, (3.34)
,ABfl S flAil tf8, (3.35)
and the fact that
2(A) < ,Axl.___ZI< ;(A) (3.36)
-- Ilxll
the left-hand side of (3.33) may be replaced by
Ifl _ [QTI(L(_ - tf))] (3.37)
where the inf(.) has been replaced by the lower singular value from (3.36)
and (3.26) was substituted for f{t). We then have that
* Note that without this simplification, one has to deal with (3.17) directly
which is rather awkward.
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Ifl 2[Q_I(L(T-tf))] > 2 sup llL(s)N(s) ÷ L(s)W(s)T(s)R(s)II
A,n
(3.38)
Now if we ensure that
Ill __[0 ](L(T-tf)] > 2 Sup(IIL(s)II_HN(s)H
+ IIA(S)H IIL(s)T(s)R(s)II
(3.39)
then using (3.35) and the fact that
IIA+BII < IIAII + IIBII (3.40)
w
(3.37) follows from (3.38) since the right-hand side of (3.38) is smaller than
(3.38). Furthermore, if we use the identity [28]
nail2 = _(a) = max IA(j=)I (3.41)
t_
then the right-hand side of (3.39) may be written using (3.27), (3.41),
(3.28), and (3.30) as
2(max IL(j_)I _ + 61rI_[QTI(LT)(_)]) (3.42)
W
Substituting (3.42) for the right-hand side of (3.39) we now have
IFI2[Q iL(T-tf) ] > 2 (max= IL(j_)I n ÷ alrI_[Q_I(LT)(_)])
(3.43)
where we have used the assumption that
r(t) = r l(t) (3.44)
If we define the threshold as
Jth(T) _ max IL(j=)In + 61rl _[QTI(LT)(T)] (3.45)
and
B(T) _ 0 l(L(T-tf)) (3.46)
then (3.43) may be written as
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2Jth (_)
(3.4?}
which is the desired relation (3.14). Q.E.D.
Figure 3.1 shows a conceptual plot of Ifl vs. T. Note that in the
presence of noise, the detection window must be large enough to separate noise
\
from the bias shift due to sensor failure. Further, there is a detection
window T, dependent on tf, such that Ifl is a minimum. But,
tf is not known; consequently, one can only evaluate the effect of window
selection. Figure 3.1 is also useful in evaluating the filter dynamics. If
the dynamics of the filter are fast, there is a sharper, lower threshold than
when the filter is slow. Figure 3.1 illustrates this critical trade-off in
filter design, i.e., threshold vs. detection window. Figure 3.2 shows a
typical plot of threshold Jth vs. T. In Theorem 3.1, we assumed that
the reference input signal was a step. However, other reference input signals
may be used such as a ramp input signal, as done in the examples below.
Example 3.1: Consider the following scalar example, where
a
Po(s) = --s+a' (3.48)
with proportional plus integral control
a
G (s) = l +- (3.49)
c s
and filter dynamics,
k
F(s) = -- (3.50)
s+a
then from (2.27),
G(s) C S(s) : _ T(s) =
: s' s+a' s+a (3.51)
s+a k
L(s) : _ M(s) : " (3 52)s_a+k ' s+a+k
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_f(_)
_RESNOLD _...
0
I _'_ STIMATOR
' KJ 1
_-----_r- -- - -4-
I
t? 'I '2
f(T) smallest size of detectable failure
tf: time failure occurs
3: length of detection window
Figure 3.1 Threshold Selector: Minimum Detectable Bias Shift (f) vs.
Detection Window (T)
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THRESHOLD
Jth (")
J: Threshold
Jth: Threshold for large detection window
w
n: RMS noise
T: length of moving detection window
Figure 3.2 Threshold vs. Detection Window
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' and
a
L(s)T(s) - s+a+k (3.53)
Now
and
LT(t) : _-l[ a
rI s(s+a+k){
: a--_(l- e-(a+k)t) (3.54)
L(t) = _],-IJ s+a
rI [s(s+a+k)
a k -(a÷k)t
- a+k + a-_ e (3.55)
Therefore,
I)O l LT(T) = _ a__( l _ e-(a+k)t) 2dt I/2 (3.56)
T-t
(I _0 f[ a K e-(a+k)t]2dt)I/2OTl L(T - tf) = _ a-_ + a-_ (3.57)
and after the integrations have been performed, we obtain
I ]QTI LT(T)= a -2(a÷k)_ a+k)T I/22(a+k) 3T [2(a+k)_ - 3 - e + 4e -( ]
(3.58)
OTIL(_-tf) : I 1 [2a2(a+k)(T_tf) _ k2e-2(a+k)(T-tf)2T(a+k) 3
2 I I/2
- 4ake-(a+k)(T-tf ) + k ÷ 4ak] i
(3.59)
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Since the singular value of a scalar quantity is simply its absolute value,
then
!
_[(QT]LT)(_)] = I(QT] LT)(T)I (3.60)
and
_[(QTI L) (T-tf)] : I(QT]L)(T-tf)l (3.61)
Also we have that
_(L(j_)) = _" a2 ÷ 2(a+k)2+ _2 (3.62)
and
max _[L(J_)] = l since a > 0 and k > 0 (3.63)
Finally, 'we obtain For the threshold
3th(T) = n • alrl I(QTI LT)(_)I (3.64)
or
Jth(_) = n + 61rl •
and
I[2 ] Ia -2(a+k) T a+k) _] I/22(a+k) 3T [2(a+k)T - 3 - e ÷ 4e-(
(3.65)
8(T) = I(Q L)(T)IT! (3.66)
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or
i 2T(a+k)
2 -2(a+k)(T-tf)
3 [2a2(a+k)(T-tf ) - K e
-(a+k)(T-tf) K2 }i121- 4aKe + + 4aK] (3.67)
The closed-form solution of threshold as a function of the detection window is
given by
2 Jth(T)
: B(-TT)- (3.68)
In the limit as _ _ ®
I aJth(®) _ n + 61rl (a+k) = constant. (3.69)
a (3.70)
B(®) _ (a+k)
and
f(_) _ 2[nl L_-_)-I+a 61rl] : constant. (3.71)
For the case of soft failures, one can derive similar closed-form
expressions. For example, soft failures with a_ramp reference input r
- I { a2 3 a2Jth(_) = n + 61rl L a 2 -2(a+k)_T 2(a+k) 5 e + + )4(a+k) 2 3 (a+k
2 2 2 -(a+k)T
2a2 e-(a+k)T a T 2a e
5 3 5 ((a+k)_+l)
(a+k) (a+k) (a+k)
2(a+k) 5
I/2
(3.72)
6B
(](T) = I 1 [ a2 (_-tf)T (a+k) 2 3
K2 -2(a+k) (_-tf)
e
5
2(a+k)
_r
K2
(a+k)4 (T-tf) +
aK
(a+k)3 (T-tf)2 +
2K2
(a+k) 5
-(a+k)(T-tf)
e
÷
2aK -(a+k)(T-tf)
e
(a+k) 5
((a+k)(T-tf) + l)
3K2 2aK Ill/2(2(a+k) 5 (a+k) 5
(3.73)
Figure 3.3 shows the results for the hard failure with two different
m
estimator speeds. The parameters being used are a=l, tf=.001, c=.01,
a=.05, y=l, K=2 (slow estimator), and K=lO (fast estimator). This shows
that the threshold selector is also useful in evaluating the filter dynamics.
If the dynamics of the filter are fast, there is a sharper minimum in f and
generally lower thresholds than when the filter is slow.
The results for soft failures with the same parameters are shown in
Figure 3.4. Note that the behavior is quite different From before. For hard
failures, there is a single sharp minimum in f which corresponds to a very
small detection window, For soft failures, f has a hyperbolic type
behavior. There is not a unique minimum, and a larger detection window
compared to the hard failure case needs to be selected. These results are
quite reasonable as they agree with intuition.
3.1.3 A Computer-Aided Desiqn Approach for Computinq Optimal Thresholds
It was anticipated that a closed-form solution for the multivariable case
was not possible hence a computer-aided design (CAD) approach was also
developed for the threshold selector analysis. The basic operations involved
in the computation of the thresholds are calculations of frequency response
characteristics of L and transient response matrices of L and LT dynamic
systems. Note that the expression for L is
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-l
L(s) = (I + F(s))
which is simply the inverse return difference matrix of the filter. To
compute the transient response of systems with transfer functions L(s) and
L(s)T(s), a (minimal) state-space realization of these systems is required.
In the single-input/single-output (SISO) case, a minimal state-space
realization for L(s) denoted by (Ar_ , Br_, Cry, Dry) can be
written down by inspection. Similarly, LT is a dynamic system whose transfer
function involves products of certain inverse return matrices, etc. as shown
in Figure 3.5. To obtain a minimal realization (Ar, Br, Cr, Dr) for
this system, the block diagram manipulation facility of CTRL-C [21] called
INTERC was used. To use this tool, the different blocks in the system block
diagram are numbered as shown in Figure 3.5. The various interconnections are
then specified. The procedure yields a non-minimal realization for the system
of order n = 5 in this case. The procedure MINREAL* is then utilized to
s
obtain a minimal realization for the system which is of order n : l and
s
agrees with hand calculations. Suppose h(t) is the impulse response of
L(s)T(s) system corresponding to the state-space realization (Ar, Br,
C , O) _nd hl(t) is the impulse response of L(s) systemr r
corresponding to the state-space realization (Ar_, Br_, Cry,
0 ). Then the threshold is given by
r_
2(n + 61rl Q_I(LT))
f , (3.74)
QTI(L(T-tf))
T t t
0 0 0
f : (3.75)
,g(T [ hl(ta)dt3]'[ hl(t4)dt4 ]dt)l/2
0 0
*MINREAL uses the staircase algorithm to remove uncontrollable and/or
unobservable modes.
?4
fT
G(s)
c(s) Po(s}
(9 ®
® ®
L
(I._r(_))"I
®
y_
LT
Figure 3.5 Block Diagram For SISO Case: CAD Method
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where
t
_o h(.)d(.) = step response of (A , Br, Cr, Dr)r
(3.76)
and
t
L hl(.)d(. ) = step response of (Ar_, Br_, Cry, Dr9.)
(3.77)
A procedure was then written in CTRL-C to calculate the threshold curve for
Example 3.1. Figure 3.6 shows the plots of the thresholds generated by CTRL-C
both for the closed form and the CAD technique using the same values of
parameters. The integration step for the CAD plot is .OOl sec. The slight
discrepancy in the two curves would disappear if smaller integration steps are
used. Figure 3.7 shows the plots of threshold selector for a slow (a=l,k=l)
and a fast (a=l,k=lO) estimator.
Example 3.2: Multivariable Control of a Turbofan Engine
To illustrate the idea of threshold selector in the multivariable case, a
model of a turbofan engine and its multivariable control at sea level static
conditions with a power lever angle (PLA) of 36 ° was chosen [12].
The states of the system are
Xl = Fan Speed, SNFAN (N]) - rpm
X2 = Compressor Speed, SNCOM (N2) - rpm
X3 = Burner Exit Slow Response Temperature,
Tt41o - oR
X4 = Fan Turbine Inlet Slow Response Temperature,
Tt4.51o - °R
The engine controls are:
U1 = Main Burner Fuel Flow, WFMB - Ib/hr
U2 = Nozzle Jet Area, Aj - ft2
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U3 =
U4=
U5=
Fan Guide VaneAngle, FGV- deg
CompressorStator Vane Angle, SVA- deg
CompressorBleed Flow, BLC- %
and the engine outputs are
Yl = Fan Speed, SNFAN(Nl) - rpm
Y2 = CompressorSpeed, SNCOM(N2) - rpm
Y3 = Burner Pressure, PT4- psia
Y4 = AugmentorPressure, PT6- psia
Y5 = Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature, FTIT - °R
The normalized system matrices for the example are shownin Table 3.1. The
open loop poles are at -3.1616, -2.880?, -.7036 and -I.0865. There are two
transmission zeros at -I.7294 and -.6456 and were computedusing the algorithm
in Ref. 22. It is interesting that one of the transmission zeros of the
system is at -.6456 which indicates why it is not possible to move the slow
temperature pole at -.?036 very far. The multivariable control law is
proportional plus integral [6,7]
Gc(S) = Cp ÷ !s CI (3.78)
where the (normalized) proportional gain matrix (Cp) and the integral galn
matrix (CI) are as shownin Table 3.2. The (normalized) filter gain matrix
(K) is as shownin Table 3.2 and corresponds to filter poles at
-II.2034, -8.07?7, -2.0051, -.6817
The transfer function matrices of interest are given by
-l
Nominal Plant: Po(S) = C(sI-A) 8 + D (3.79)
!
Controller: Gc(S) = Cp + s CI (3.BO)
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Table 3.1
System Matrices for the Example
A
-3.9180D+00
-1.8061D-01
-1,3190D-01
-3.8191D-01
4.1886D+00
-2.1480D+00
-2.4056D-01
-I.0501D+00
-4.1148D-02
1.5853D-01
-6.6630D-01
-6.7400D-02
1.2279D-01
6.6994D-04
2.3770D-04
-2.0000D+O0
B _
5.1991D-01
3.6266D-01
2.8427D-01
9.3743D-01
1.1942D+00
I.O836D-01
3.3231D-02
7.3072D-02
2.1974D-01
7.2562D-03
5.7770D-03
1.7417D-02
-2.4990D-02
-1.2133D-O2
5.7672D-03
2.0418D-O2
-1.7226D-02
-7.2114D-03
1.6319D-03
1.0634D-01
C __
2.2043D+01
O.0000D+O0
3.7700D+00
8.O543D+00
-2.9070D+00
0.0000D+OO
2.7339D+01
1.0341D+01
3.1436D-O1
-7.9884D+00
O.0000D+O0
0.0000D+00
-7.6298D-03
-6,6634D-O2
-5.1265D-01
O.O000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
-4.3237D-03
-3.7135D-02
2.6855D-03
D _
0.0000D+O0
O.000OD+O0
1.0036D+00
9,7674D-01
7.1316D+00
0.O00OD+OO
0.O000D+00
-8.2350D-01
-5.7450D+00
5.5560D-01
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+00
-1.5200D-01
-3.8500D-01
1,3247D-01
0.O000D+O0
0.O000D+O0
-5.6233D-02
9.5762D-03
1.5533D-01
0.O000D+00
O.O000D+O0
-5.8600D-02
-2.2963D-02
4.8290D-02
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Proportional
Table 3.2
Gain Matrix (Cp), Integral
Filter Gain Matrix (K)
Gain Matrix (Cl),
K
2.3692D-01
6.8145D-02
2.3950D-02
2.0241D-O2
1.9395D-01
2.8495D-01
3.578OD-02
6.0917D-02
1.0177D-02
5.1618D-03
2.3172D-04
-5.O971D-04
3.7510D-04
3.6090D-05
2.1026D-05
-4.4286D-06
-1.6788D-02
-9.9733D-03
5.0178D-04
1.9605D-03
Cp
-4,6597D-02
-2.2281D-02
-8.5667D-02
9.4676D-02
8.0500D-01
-2.2423D-01
-4.5208D-07
0.0000D+O0
-2.9942D-01
2.3320D+00
-5.3984D-O1
O.OO00D+00
0.0000D+00
O.0000D+00
7.5286D+00
-2.5951D-02
3.5198D-02
4.1154D-02
5.4087D-02
O,O000D+O0
O.O000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+00
O.O000D+O0
Cl
-I.0062D+00
-2.3333D-01
0.O000D+O0
O.O000D+O0
O.O000D+OO
O.O000D+OO
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
O.000OD+O0
O.OO00D+O0
O.OO00D+O0
O.O000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
O.OOOOD+00
O.O00OD+OO
-1.7247D-02
2.9998D-02
O.O000D+00
O.0000D+00
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+00
O.OOOOD+O0
O.0000D+00
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+00
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Filter:
From (2.26)
F(s) : C(sl-A)-IK
G(s) = P (s) Gc(S)o
1 c
- [C(sI-A)-lB + D][Cp + s
s(s) --[I + G(s)]
i]
(3.81)
(3.82)
(3.83)
and
-l
T(s) - [I + G(s)] G(s)
L(s) = [I ÷ C(sI-A)-IK] -l
M(s) : [I + C(sI-A)-IK] -I F(s)
(3.84)
(3.85)
(3.86)
max _[L(J_)] : II.9122 (3.87)
Again it is relatively simple to obtain a minimal realization of L(s).
state-space matrices are denoted by (Art ' Brt , Crt , Drt ) and are as in
Table 3.3. The poles are at
The
-11.2034, -8.077, -2.0051, -.6817
and the transmission zeros are at
-3.1616, -.7036, -2.880?, -I.9865
The block diagram of L(s)T(s) Is as shown In Figure 3.8. INTERC was
used to obtain a non-minimal realization of the system. Note that for the
purposes of defining the output to CTRL-C, it is necessary to introduce a
fictitious block (6) in the diagram. The order of the non-minimal realization
is n = 27. MINREAL was used to yield a minimal realization of order
s
ns = lO*. The final results for (Ar, Br, Cr, Dr.) are displayed in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.3
Associated State-Space Matrices (Ar_, Br_ , Crt , Dr_ )
ARL
-2.0003D+OO
-7.2277D-O3
-1.2263D-O1
-1.5242D-03
5.9409D-02
-6.6573D-01
-5.0294D-02
1.5345D-01
8.2386D-01
-6.5511D-01
-9.2306D+00
-1.7314D+00
2.7009D+00
-1.2030D+00
-1.3534D+00
-I.0071D+OI
BRL
-2.0366D-02
2.3844D-02
2.3692D-O1
6.8145D-02
-6.1104D-02
3.5460D-02
1.9395D-01
2.8495D-01
5.0848D-04
2.3439D-04
1.0177D-02
5.1618D-03
4.3184D-06
2.1049D-05
3.7510D-04
3.6090D-05
-1.9631D-03
4.9150D-04
-1.6788D-02
-9.9733D-03
CRL
O.O000D+00
2.2204D-16
4.3636D-03
3.7484D-02
-8.3267D-17
1.3878D-16
3.3307D-16
-7.6070D-03
-6.6438D-02
-5.1265D-01
2.2043D+01
2.2204D-16
3.7700D+00
8.0543D+00
-2.9070D+00
6.6613D-16
2.7339D+01
1.0341D+01
3.1436D-01
-7.9884D+OO
DRL
-i. O. O. O. O.
O. -I. O. O. O.
O. O. -I. O. O.
O. O. O. -i. O,
0 " 0 I 0 . 0 l --l .
B3
--d
®
@
!
0
r-
Q;
3"
u')
X
0
0
¢0
Q.)
IJ-
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The poles of Ar are
-11.2034 + O.O000i
-8.0777 + O.O000i
-4.7046 - O.O000i
-2.6196 + 1.8997i
2.7863 + O.O000i
-2.0051 + O.O000i
-0.734? + O.O000i
-0.6B17 ÷ O.O000i
-0.I034 ÷ O.O000i
and the transmission zeros are
-1.9865, -.7036, -3.1616, -2.8807
which are as expected.
The (QTI)LT Is then of the form
(3.88)
where h(-) is the impulse response matrix of the (Ar, Br, Cr,
D ) system and its (i j)-th element is the response of the i-th
r
component of the output to an impulse applied at the j-th component of the
input while all other components of the input are zero and the initial state
is zero. Note that an expression such as:
t
J_o h(tl) dtl = step response matrix
(3.89)
* This is a numerically delicate problem.
chosen to be I00 c where
C D 2
The tolerance for MINREAL should be
is the machine precision.
B5
Table 3.4
Final Results for (A r, Br, C r, D r)
AN I
Starting at
-1.8833D+00
3 0702D-O2 -i.
3 0137D-01 I.
-i 6443D-01 -2.
-i 3275D-01 8.
-3 1541D-02 -i.
00000D+OO i.
0 0000D+O0 O.
0 O00OD+O0 O.
0 O000D+OO O.
row
2.2461D-02
9773D+00
1797D-02
1904D-01
5894D-03
1947D-02
2095D-01
0000D+O0
O000D+O0
O000D+O0
i columns 1 thru
4 1244D-01
5 3534D-02
-7 7122D-01
7 2472D-02
-5 1391D-02
-3 1920D-02
-i 6299D-02
1 4931D-01
0 0000D+O0
0 O000D+O0
Starting at
4.7572D-01
6.1265D-01
-2.1959D+00
-2.7577D+00
-i 1208D+01
-4.9271D+00
-9 4908D+00
-4 2548D+00
6,6487D-01
-I 2398D+01
1.7422D+00
-1.5215D+00
-1.3057D+00
6.3804D-01
1.9845D+00
1.3970D+00
4.9505D-02
-8.4370D+00
-6.2387D-01
3.6584D+00
row I columns 7 thru
2 IIOOD+00
-9 IIISD-01
-2 2261D+O0
-2 9244D+00
-6 1724D+00
-i 6149D+00
-6 5492D+00
-I 4728D+01
-6 3950D+00
-i 6509D-01
6
-9.7421D-02
-1.2298D-01
2.5823D-02
-6.8127D-01
3.4825D-04
-2.5310D-02
-4.6428D-02
1.8504D-02
1.5650D-01
O.O000D+O0
I0
4 8148D-01
I 1621D+00
-5 5108D-01
-7 6130D-01
-I 0806D+00
-i 3658D+O0
-3 6488D-O1
-6 2005D-O1
1 2374D-01
-6 3510D+00
8.6466D-02
-1.4802D-01
8.9131D-01
1.8765D+00
4.0643D-01
2.0529D+00
3.1668D-01
1.4743D+00
-7.9998D-01
1.1380D+01
6 8098D-04
4 3156D-02
1 5985D-01
3 0526D-01
-6 3688D-01
4 4477D-02
7 7116D-01
1 9028D-O1
1 4590D-01
2 1815D+00
BR
I
3
-6
-I
-2
-i
-5.
-[.
5.
-6.
2913D-02
52!6D-02
2897D-02
1748D-01
6848D-01
8192D-01
3986D-02
3163D-01
2728D-02
2446D-01
-3 5065D-03
-3 5419D-03
5 7229D-03
-2 7295D-02
1 7852D-02
-i 4634D-03
-4 5738D-02
-5 5903D-04
-5 1607D-02
-7 4094D-03
6.7581D-02
9.7594D-02
-9.2170D-03
-2.5362D-02
5.285OD-02
-1.2483D-03
-I.1493D-01
6.5713D-03
-1.2889D-01
-2.7436D-02
-9.3985D-03
-1.3254D-02
1.8487D-03
-5.6664D-03
-2.0758D-02
1.4683D-02
2.1870D-02
-4.2030D-03
8.8618D-03
1,8488D-04
0 O000D+O0
0 O000D+O0
0 0000D+00
0 0000D+O0
0 0000D+O0
0 0000D+O0
0.0000D+O0
0.0000D+O0
0.O000D+OO
O.O000D+O0
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
CR
Starting at row i columns i thru 6
1.9429D-16 -3.8858D-16 -I,1796D-16 -3,6082D-16
-5.0220D-16 -3.4001D-16 -1.9663D-15 -1.3704D-16
-6.8955D-17 -9.3675D-17 -2.6877D-16 -1.7781D-17
1.4572D-16 -3.1919D-16 -2,2291D-16 -1.7347D-16
1.3878D-16 2.7756D-16 2.6472D-15 -4.7184D-16
Starting at row I columns 7 thru I0
-3.7131D+01 -3.0531D-16 -8.8840D+00 0.O000D+O0
9.5083D+00 -2.3928D+01 -3.9740D+01 1.5959D-16
f2.7291D+O0 -I.0432D+01 -2.3954D+00 1.0780D+00
-1.5132D+O1 -5.4949D-01 4.9940D+00 -2.7756D-17
-3.3307D-16 2.3384D-15 7.6032D+01 -6.9389D-17
4.4409D-16
-9.0206D-16
-5.8981D-17
1.6653D-16
6.1062D-16
2.2204D-16
-6.9389D-18
1.0446D+00
6.8199D+00
-1.6653D-16
DR
0.00OOD+00
O.0000D+00
3.7478D-02
-9.9875D-02
1.8695D-01
0.0000D+O0
O.O000D+00
1.6983D-01
1.2594D-01
9.2186D-01
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
4.8632D-01
2.8937D-01
1.7470D+00
O.0000D+O0
O.0000D+O0
2.6586D-02
1.8044D-01
3.1605D-02
0.0000D+00
0.0000D+00
O.0000D+00
0.0000D+00
O.O000D+O0
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is a step response matrix, where the (l,j)-th element of it is the response
at time t of the i-th component of the output when the j-th component of
the input is a step function while all other components of the input are zero
and the Initlal state is the zero state. In this case the step response
matrix is a 5x5 matrix. Slmilar statements apply to (QTI)L operator.
We finally compute the multlvariable threshold as
2Jth(T)
f(_) - B(_) (3.90)
where
Jth(T) : (max _[L(j_)])n ÷ 6]rI_[(QTILT)(T)]
W
8(T) = o_[(OtiL)(_ - tf)]
(3.9])
(3.92)
m
llnli < n (3.93)
T
;(a(j_)) < & (3.94)
The threshold selector results for the hard failure case are as shown In
Figure 3.9. Note the similarity with the scalar case. The results for the
soft Failure case are as shown in Figure 3.10.
3.1.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the effect of model error on detection. An
innovative Framework was developed to determine the effect of model error on
sensor failure DIA algorithms analytically. A new concept ca]led threshold
selector was introduced. The threshold selector analysis allows determination
of optimal threshold and size of smallest detectable failure as a function of
model error bound, noise, variance, speed of the filter, class of reference
B8
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input signal, and class of failure signal. The threshold selector constitutes
a powerful design aid and allows one to arrive at a proper balance between
robustness and DIA sensitivity. The analysis in this chapter can be extended
to isolation and accommodationproblems, as well as other DIA designs than
those d scussed here.
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IV. ROBUSTFILTERDESIGNFORDIA
This chapter discusses the design of robust filters for use as part of a
sensor failure DIA algorithm. The robustness of the filter is due to
introduction of an internal model as well as frequency-shaping of the LQGcost
functional. The necessity of the internal model was discussed in Chapter II
(see Section 2.2.3). Recall that the presence of an internal model results in
asymptotically unbiased filter estimates. The internal model also provides
robustness with respect to parameter perturbations. However, since other
sources of model uncertainty are present (see Chapters I and If), the filter
maybe mademore robust by frequency shaping of the LQGcost Functional. This
is a result of taking the boundon model error into account. The concepts are
applied to a multlvariable turbofan engine example.
4.1 PROBLEMFORMULATION
A filter maybe maderobust by introduction of an internal model and by
frequency shapinq. The internal model provides robustness with respect to
parameter perturbations and results in asymptotically unbiased estimates. The
filter may be made more robust by adding dynamics to the filter to compensate
For other types of modeling uncertainty. This can be done in a formal way by
replacing the constant weighting matrices in a standard LQG cost Functional
with weighting matrices which are functions of frequency. This is referred to
as frequency shaping. The weighting matrices are chosen to reflect model
uncertainty. For example, if there is unmodeled high-frequency dynamics, the
weighting matrices may be chosen to be constant over the Frequency range where
the system model is known accurately and increase as a function of frequency
in the frequency range where the model is less accurate. This section
discusses the design of robust Filters for sensor failure DIA which employ
both an internal model and frequency shaping.
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4.1.1 Filter with Internal Model
The internal model principle and its application to robust filter design
was discussed in Section 2.2.3. It was shown that the internal model is
necessary to provide asymptotically unbiased estimates and robustness with
respect to Parameter perturbations. For a system with unknown constant
measurement biases, an internal model (integrators) may be introduced by state
augmentation:
I IIA°filll
0 j 0
,_ ,. t
Z = [C I] + Du
where KP and KI
IIIKPI
0
are the proportional and integral estimator gains.
(4.2)
4.1.2 Filter Desig.n with Frequency ShaPing
Consider the system described by:
state-
measurement:
where w and v
x = Ax + Bu , BlW
z = Cx + Du + v
are independent, zero-mean, white Gausslan process and
(4.3)
(4.4)
measurement noise processes.
the form
The standard Kalman filter for this system is of
x = Ax + Bu + K(z - Du - Cx)
where K is the Kalman filter gain. We desire to find a filter which
minimizes the performance index,
(4.5)
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oj = _ {(z - Cx) T R-l(z - Cx) + wT o-lw} dt
1 _0 Q-I vT R-I_ = _ {wT w + v} dt (4.6)
In this cost function, Q and R are constant matrices independent of
frequency. Using Parseval's theorem, the performance index in (4.4) can be
transferred to the frequency domain
j_l /®2_ {W*(j_) Q-Iw(j_) + V*(J_) R-Iv(jw)} d_ (4.7)
Note that the two terms in the above integrand have the constant weighting at
all frequencies. However, the model may be well known within a certain
frequency range and not known accurately outside that frequency range. It
would then seem desirable to have weighting matrices which are functions of
frequency and be able to reduce the filter gain outside model bandwidth to
reduce sensitivity and increase performance of the filter. It is possible to
consider making Q and R functions of frequency
_(_l /_2_ {W*(jw) Q-I(2) W (j(_) _- V*(j_) R-I(_ 2) V(j(_)} d(_ (4.8)
that
A sufficient condition for the existence of a Filter minimizing (4.8) is
2Q(j_) and R(J_) be positive semi-definite matrices in _ .
The problem as posed in (4.8) can be converted to a standard LQG problem
as shown below. One can treat w and v as colored noise sources generated
by shaping filters of the form
W(j,_) = Ql/2(jw) W'(j_) (4.9)
m
v(j_) : RI/2(j_) V (j_) (4.10)
where W' and V' are white noise processes. Ql/2 and RI/2
roots of Q and R such that
are square
g6
Q(Jw) = ol/2(jw) [Ql/2(Jw)]* (4.11)
R(jw) : Rl/2(jw) [Rl/2(jw)] * (4.12)
where Ql/2(j_) and Rl/2(jw) are rational functions of jw.
In sensor failure DIA, the primary cause for the use of frequency-shaping
is unmodeled dynamics. In our application to the engine problem, Q is taken
to be constant (i.e., independent of frequency) and R is chosen as
r2 (J + rI)
= -- , rI > r2 (4.13)
R rl (w2 + r2)
(see Example 4.1). Note that strictly proper transfer functions in
R-I/2(j_) would cause R(j_) to approach zero at high frequency. This
implies perfect measurements. Therefore, in practice, one should choose
-I/2
R (jw) to be proper.
Next, the modifiea measurement z1
zI = z - Du : Cx + v = y + v
If we define a shaped-measurement vector
l
Zl(j_) = R(j_) -I/2 Zl(J_ )
and the noise-free shaped output
l
Y (Jw) = R(J_) -I/2 Y(j_)
is considered
then a realization of the system with transfer function matrix
= + Bv Cx_v Av Xv
(4.14)
(4.15)
(4.16)
-I/2
R(J_) is
(4.]7)
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!y = Cv xv ÷ Dv Cx (4.18)
with the shaped-measurement equation
I I
zI = Cv xv ÷ Dv Cx + v (4.19)
where v' is a white noise process as in (4.10).
The combination of equations (4.3) and (4.4), and (4.17), (4.18), and
(4.191 defines a dynamic system driven by independent white noise sources and
is a standard Kalman filtering problem:
• I I
x = Ax + Bu + Ke(Z l - Zl) (4.20)
xv = Av xv + Bv Cx + Kv(Z l - zl) (4.21)
' -1/2
zI is obtained from z using the realization of R :
xz = Av xz + Bv zI (4.22)
!
= + D zI (4.22)Zl Cv Xz v
Since equations (4.17) and (4.18), and (4.22) and (4.23) involve the same
realization, the redundancy in the estimation equations can be eliminated by
defining a new set of states [23]
x' = xz - xv (4.24)
The overall Frequency-shaped estimator equations are then given by
9B
[Ae°vC
(KvO v - Bv) C
I
I
I
A
S
KeCv
Av - KvC v
J
Ke Ov ]Bv - Kv Ov)'
Bls
[i.]_ . Xx = [c ,: o]
C
S
Z + [ i,i'eOv]u
Dv - Bv) D
Bs (4.25)
(4.26)
The control law is then based on x
u : KRIXI (4.27)
where KR is the regulator gain. A block diagram of the system showing the
frequency-shaped optimal estimator is shown in Figure 4.1. The filter in Eqs.
(4.22) and (4.23) acts as a prefilter on the measurements.
Theorem 4.1: The zeros of R-1/2 are the transmission zeros of the
frequency-shaped estimator whenever the sensors are frequency-shaped
individually.
Proof: The transmission zeros of the estimator (with input z and
output x) are given by those frequencies such that the matrix pencil
S(k) loses rank
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( x
E_ E]
E_
C'-f,
!
A
t--
w
L
0
E
°_,.
1,1
0
E
0
L
I1
lO0 "
) BI]
sI -A s _ s
i 0S(×) = Cs I
I sl - A ÷ K O C - K C
e v e v
S(k) = - (KvD v - Bv) C sI - Av + Kv Cv
I 0
K D
e v
(B v - Kv Dv)]
(4.28)
(4.29)
By performing elementary row and column operations,
I
sl_- A t 0 =
" l I
I
.... °v I
i I
I I 0 l
s(x)
K D
e v
Bv - Kv Ov
is equivalent to
(4.30)
-I
which loses rank at the location of the eigenvalues of (Av + Bv Dv Cv)
which are the ZerOs of R-1/2 since it is diagonal, as are Av, Bv, Cv,
and O . Q.E]O
V
-I/2
In the case of individually frequency-shaped sensors, R would be
diagonal and, if a frequency shaping of first order is introduced in all
sensors then
-I/2 Pi(s + Zi)
Rii =
Zi(s + Pi)
(4.31)
and hence
Av = diag {Pi } (4.32)
B = I
V
Cv = diag {
Pi(Zi - Pl)
Zi
(4.33)
} (4.34)
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(pl)Dv = diag
Notice that Rii's have unity D.C. gain. These will introduce lag
compensators into the measurement loops provided that
(4.35)
IZil > IPil (4.36)
which implies more noise at higher frequencies. Frequency shaping then
improves the robustness properties of the system at higher frequencies, while
maintaining performance at low frequencies. Notice that this is similar to
introduction of first-order lags of classical control, but is inherently
multivariable.
4.2 EXAMPLE 4.1
This example illustrates the ideas of internal model and frequency
shaping presented in Sections 2.2.3 and 4.1, respectively. The internal model
provides for asymptotically unbiased estimates in the presence of biases and
parameter errors, i.e., the estimate of the engine outputs track the output
measurements (i.e., z - z _ 0). Frequency shaping provides For robustness
with respect to unmodeled dynamic uncertainties. The combination of the
internal model and frequency shaping results in the desirable robustness
properties of the filter.
A turbofan engine model and its multivariable control law (the same as in
Example 3.2) at sea level static condition and PLA=36 ° was chosen for design
purposes. Figure 4.2a shows a steady-state run corresponding to Revision 2 of
the previous program [g]. This figure shows that the estimate of Nl, N2, PT4,
^
PT6, and FTIT do not track the measurements (i.e., z - z # 0 asymptotically).
If an internal model (integrators) for biases is introduced, then the
augmented system has the Form of (4.1) and (4.2). The estimator gains were
computed using CTRL-C [21] and are shown in Table 4.1. Figure 4.2b shows a
steady-state run with the internal model present in the engine/control model.
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Table 4.1
Kalman Filter Gain Matrix _
8.3760
4. 5611
1.3178
3.1891
-12.4951
2.0933
0.2311 0.0303
O. 4499 0.0173
0.0836 010048
0.670"1 -0.0033 0.0006 0.0001
Wtog---63 --o.'55-s3 -o: ta
0.0009 2.9770 0.0051 -0.00i4
0.0121 0.0476 1.5822 0.0000
0.0019 0 0036 0.0001 1.2247
_).0945 -0. 1824 --0.0054 -O. O00t
: n
-0.6314
-t.2775
-0.2963
-0.0004
-0.0429
0.0421
-0.0013
-0.0003
t.0077
I Filter
I Internal Model
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(This corresponds to Revision 3 of the previous program [9].) Figure 4.2b
shows that the estimates nowasymptotically track the measurements(i.e.,
z - z _ O) for all outputs. Note that there is a dip in Figures 4.2a and
4.2b, which is due to initialization transients of the engine simulation.
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b are transient runs at sea level static condition and a
PLAstep from PLA=36° to 52° Figure 4.3a shows transient responses with no
internal model and Figure 4.3b illustrates the responses with the internal
model present. It can be seen from Figure 4.3b that the estimates follow the
A
measurements, i.e., z _ z ) O, in steady state.
There are now two internal models in the closed-loop system (i.e.,
integrators both in the filter and controller. Figure 4.4 is a block diagram
of the system showing the two internal models. The presence of the internal
model in the filter ensures z - z 4 O, and the presence of the internal
A
model in the controller ensures z - r _ O, which implies that r - z _ 0 in
steady state. Note that the controller has a partial internal model, i.e. it
only has integrators on Nl and PT6 outputs (see form of CI in Table 4.2).
Therefore, even thoughall the estimates are unbiased, we can only guarantee
zero steady-state tracking error in Nl and PT6 as seen in Figure 4.2b
and 4.3b. Note that in Figure 4.2b and 4.3b for the PT6 output, z - z error
has become zero whereas z - r error has not. This is because the integrator
(in the control law) associated with PT6 output has a small gain which
explains why this error is slow in decaying to zero (for details, see Ref. g).
We can now proceed to add frequency shaping in the filter. Based on the
results of a bound on model error (Appendix A), we chose to frequency-shape
all sensors using
-I/2(s lO_(s + 20_)
Rii ) = 20=(s + lO_)
i.e., a first-order lag with breakpoint at 5 Hz.
matrices {Av, Bv' Cv' Dv}
(4.37)
The frequency-shaped system
are shown in Table 4.3, and Table 4.4 shows the
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Table 4.2
Proportional and Integral Gain Matrices
CP
-0.46_2
-0.0002
0.0065
-0.0025
0.0000
-I._502
0.0000
O. OOOO
0.0068
0.0001
-62.6000
0.0000
0.0000
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-30.0927
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-0.342?
-0.%640
0.0000
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0.0000
Cl
-I0.00_2
-0.0020
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0.0000
O. 0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
O. 0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-20.0000
0.0300
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Z
II0
ORiGiNAL
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Table 4.3
Frequency-Shaped System Matrices
QUALITY
AV
-31 415q 00000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000
0.0000 -31. 4[59 0.0000 0 0000 O. 0000
0 00Q0 0 0000 -31_4159 0.0000 0.0000
0 0000 0.0000 0.0000 -31.4t59 0.0000
0. 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -31. 4159
IIV
I 0 0 0 0
0 l 0 0 0
0 0 t 0 0
0 0 0 ! O.
0 0 O. O. 1
CV =
15 7000 0.0000 0 0000 0.0000
0 0003 15 7080 0 0000 0 0000
0.0000
0.0000
0 0000 0.0000 L5 7080 0 0000 0.0000
0 0000 0.0000 0.0000 15.7080 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 0.0000 t_ 7080
0V
0 5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000
0 0000 0.5000 0.0000 0 0000 0 0000
0 0000 0.0000 0.5000 0,0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 0 0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 O. 5000
Table 4.4
Frequency-Shaped Filter Gain
KK
"83760
4 5611
! 3178
00701
3 tsqt 0 23ll
12 495[ 0 4499
20933 00836
-0 0033 0 0006
0 0303 -0 6314
0 0173 -l. 277_
0 0048 -0.2963
0.0001 -0 0004
-0.00|8 -0, 04_9
-0 0014 0 0421
0.0000 -0. 00t3
t.2247 -0.0003
-0.000t 1.0077
"--6- 0ITYl _ Er4'F
0.0003 -0.0272
0.0000 -0 00t0
0 _379 0 0000
-0 0001 0.0357
2.4511 t 0903 0 0253
0.0009 2q770 0 005t
o o121 o o47_ I 582_
o oot_ 00036 o ooot
-_0945 -0 t824 -O 0054
0 2647 T O-TT_ ----6 0-63"4-
o oqao o 351a ooo_9
o oosq 0.0095 oo48_
0 0006 0 0002 0 0000
-0 0242 -O 0374 -0 0015
..___...... ]K[
I Fllter
l lnterna! Model
IFrequency Shaping
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frequency-shaped Kalman filter gain matrix. The closed-loop filter poles are
shown in Table 4.5. Figure 4.5 shows the transient engine response corres-
ponding to the closed-loop system with both internal models and Frequency
shaping. Figure 4.5 shows the effects of the frequency shaping in this case,
i.e., the engine transient response has been slowed down slightly.
4.3 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have discussed the design of robust filters for DIA.
The robustness properties of the filters are twofold. First, the Filter is
made robust with respect to parameter perturbations, using an internal model.
This is an extension to internal model principle of multivariable robust
servomechanism theory. The robustness property achieved is due to creation of
certain structurally robust blocking zeros. Second, the filter was made
robust with respect to other sources of uncertainty via frequency shaping.
This robustness property is achieved also through creation of certain
transmission zeros. The results were applied to a multivariable turbofan
engine example.
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Table 4.5
Closed-Loop Filter Poles
-23.4786 ÷ 4.92t5i
-23.4786 - 4.9215i
-13. 1757 - O. O000i
-29. 4962 ÷ O. O000i
-0. it60 + O. O000i
-2.0722 - 0.0000*
-1.8294 - O. O0001
-0.9693 ÷ 0.0146_
-0.9693 - 0.0146_
-1.5835 + O. O000i
-1.2255 + O. O000i
-3t.4027 + O. O000i
-31.3980 + O. O000i
-31.3860 + O. O000i
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Figure 4.5 Transient Response at Sea Level Static Condition and PLA Step
Input from 36 ° to 52° at 0.2 Seconds, and with Internal Model
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V. EVALUATION RESULTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter evaluates the results of this program through the validation
of the threshold selector results of Chapter Ill. Before the actual
validation, it is useful to summarize the results of the report and put the
evaluation results into perspective.
This report has presented the results of recent research in the
development of robust fault detection, isolation, and accommodation (DIA)
algorithms for sensor failures. Specifically, tools and procedures have been
developed that allow a designer to use information about model uncertainty
when designing a sensor DIA logic. This is a major step in developing an
ability to design and implement a practical fault-tolerant control system.
A DIA system, as treated in this report, consists of three main
components:
(1) a filter that compares measurements to predictions (based on a
model) to produce an innovations sequence;
(2) a norm computation that reduces the innovations to a single
measure useful for comparing against a threshold; and
(3) a threshold.
The goal of the design process described in Figure 1.9 is to select a
combination of these three components to produce:a system that has adequate
performance (smallest magnitude of failure detectable, speed of detection, and
minimum false alarm rate) without being excessively complex.
The emphasis of this reported effort has been to provide tools and
procedures that allow the design process of Figure 1.9 to be carried out.
Specifically produced have been techniques that
ll5
(l) permit the performance of filter innovations measure combination to
be computed analytically using an estimate of the model uncertainty
in the system; and
(2) permit a filter's performance to be improved by incorporating a
knowledge of the modeling error bounds in its design.
The first was addressed in Chapter III under the heading of the Threshold
Selector; the second was addressed in Chapter IV.
Selecting the best filter/innovations measure combination is a multistep
and iterative process (Figure l.g). The filters used to generate the
innovations sequences can vary in complexity from constant gain types to ones
that include frequency shaping and internal models to a fully adaptive design.
As a general rule, increased complexity is required to improve the filter
performance. The study reported in Ref. g dealt with constant gain filters.
This report described the use of frequency shaping and internal models to
improve filter performance in the presence of modeling errors. Adaptive
filter designs are left for future studies.
Many measures of the size of innovations sequence are also possible for
consideration. Examples include weighted _um _quared [esidual (WSSR),
likelihood ratio, and generalized likelihood ratio. The performance of each
in combination with the different filters could be different and should be
investigated before a final system is designed. Note, however, that the only
measure of the innovations sequence dealt with in this effort in the WSSR
norm. This is the same as that used in Ref. 9.
While the filter and size of innovations measure selections are clearly
critical to designing a successful DIA system, it is the ability to evaluate
analytically the performance of the combination that makes the design process
of Figure l.g feasible. This capability is what is provided by the Threshold
Selector described in Chapter III. It produces an estimate of the sizes of
the smallest failures that can be detected and a measure (i.e., threshold)
against which the norm of the innovations sequence can be compared to
determine the presence of a failure.
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As an example, the threshold selector can be used to predict the
performance of the robust Filter designed in Chapter IV. Figure 5.I shows the
threshold selector results For a soft Failure using the robust filter with
internal model and frequency shaping designed in Example ¢.I. This figure
shows that the robust filter is capable of detecting failures of smaller size
compared to the constant gain filter developed in Ref. 9 (compare Figures 5.1
and 3.10).
5.2 VALIDATION OF THE THRESHOLD SELECTOR
Because of its critical role in the design process, the ability of the
Threshold Selector to predict realistic thresholds has been validated
experimentally. The goal was to demonstrate the fact that induced Failures
are detected and that false alarms are avoided.
The filter norm chosen for this demonstration is the same as that
developed in Ref. 9 for a multivariable turbofan engine. Specifically, the
Filters are constant gain Filters with no frequency shaping or internal
models. The norm is a WSSR. The flight condition is sea level static at 36°
PLA.
The reason for this filter/norm choice is that it allows direct
evaluation of the Threshold Selector only. Reasonable thresholds were
determined empirically for this combination and a full evaluation was
performed in a previous program [g]. Consequently, there is a data base
against which to compare the results obtained with a new threshold implemented.
Compared in Table 5.1 are the thresholds determined empirically in the
previous program [9] and the thresholds computed with the Threshold Selector.
Note that while the results are of similar magnitudes, the Threshold Selector
computed values are smaller. This indicates that failures of smaller
magnitude can be detected (and Faster) with the Filter/norm combination than
were previously expected. Required to be validated experimentally is that
false alarms are not induced as a result of decreasing the thresholds.
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Figure 5.1 Threshold Selector Results for Robust Filter with Internal Model
and Frequency-Shaping
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Table 5.1
Comparison of Sizes of Thresholds
TYPE OF FAILURE
HARD
SOFT
SIZE OF THRESHOLD USED IN
REVISION 2 OF REF. g
2.0
l .43
SIZE OF THRESHOLD COMPUTE[
BY THRESHOLD SELECTOR
.62
.62
Our evaluation consisted of the comparison of failure detection times for
various failures using the thresholds in Ref. g and the thresholds computed
using the threshold selector. A turbofan engine dynamic model (the same one
as in Examples 3.2 and 4.1) at sea level static condition and PLA = 36° was
used for this evaluation. Figures 5.2 through 5.4 compare the response of the
same DIA algorithm (i.e., the same filter/norm combination) for the two
threshold levels presented in Table 5.1. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 present selected
responses to a hard failure in Nl for the DIA scheme using the emDirical
threshold and the Threshold Selector computed threshold, respectively.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present the results for a hard failure in N2. Figures 5.6
and 5.? present the results of a drift failure in Nl. Figures 5.B and 5.g
present the results of a drift failure in PT4. Note that key events
characteristic of all the plots are indicated in Figure 5.2.
The results are as expected and are summarized in Table 5.2. Large step
failures create a WSSR norm of the innovations sequence larger than the
threshold in both cases and trigger a failure indication within one window
width of the WSSR norm. The size of the norm has no effect on the
performance. For drift failures, however, the smaller threshold does permit
more rapid detection of the failure.
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Figure 5.6 Failure Transients for N1 Sensor Drift Rate of 300 RPM/second at
Sea Level Static Condition and PLA = 36° using Method [g] (see
Table 5.2)
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Figure 5.7 Failure Transients for N1 Sensor Drift Rate of 300 RPM/sec at Sea
Level Static Condition and PLA = 36 using Modified Thresholds
(Table 5.1) Computed from the Threshold Selector (see Table 5.2)
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Figure 5.8 Failure Transients for PT4 Sensor Drift Rate of I0 PSl/sec at Sea
Level Static Condition and PLA = 36 using Method [9] (see Table
5.2)
130 --
7780. LO88D.
7760.
_., 77 30.
7720.
7700.
O. 2, *. B. 8. lO.
T[ME
t0870.
t0860.
t0850.
[08_0,
O. 2. 4. 6.
TIME
8° tO.
6--"
(3-
173.0
172.5
172.0
17t .5
17[ .0
170.5
PT4 SENSOR
FAILURE
O. 2. ,_. 6. 8. 10.
TIME
e..o
E--.
22.8
22.8
22.4
22.2
IBaO. a965.
X
z
1400.
1200.
4960,
4_55.
4950.
1000, 4945,
, + ,,, • |
2. 4. 8. 8. tO.
TIME
O. 2. _. O. 8. 10. O. 2. 4. 6. 8. !,0.
TIME TIME
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Table 5.2
Comparison of Detection Times
TYPE OF FAILURE
Nl HARD FAILURE
+lO00 RPM STEP
N2 HARD FAILURE
+lO00 RPM STEP
N1 DRIFT RATE OF
+300 RPM/SEC
PT4 DRIFT RATE
OF +lO PSI/SEC
DETECTION TIME (SEC) USING
METHOD (REVISION 2) [g]
0.002
0.002
4.466
4.584
DETECTION TIME (SEC)
USING THRESHOLD SELECTOR
0.002
0.002
1.734
2.042
Of primary importance in this compari'son is that this increase in
performance was gained without a penalty of false alarms. This verifies that
the Threshold Selector does produce a useful estimate of the threshold and can
replace the previously required empirical approach to threshold calculations
to accommodate modeling errors in addition to noise considerations.
5.3 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented evaluation results for this research effort.
The results of this study were summarized at the beginning of this chapter.
The evaluation validated the threshold selector results. It was verified that
the generally lower thresholds, predicted by the threshold selector analysis,
results in improvements for soft failure detection. This is done without
triggering false alarms. The detection time was lowered by at least a factor
of two for soft failures compared to previous techniques.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This report contains the results of recent research in the area of robust
fault detection, isolation, and accommodation for sensor failures. The
results have been illustrated by application to sensor DIA for an aircraft
turbine engine. At the center of attention is model uncertainty. Model
uncertainty has been singled out as the main source of problems with previous
DIA algorithms as it affects performance. Various sources of model
uncertainty were discussed. The effects of model uncertainty are represented
by a bound as a function of frequency. This is consistent with recent
approaches in robust control theory. The effects of model uncertainty on
stability, asymptotic tracking, and tracking performance was studied and new
performance robustness measures were derived. The effects of model
uncertainty on failure detection were also studied. The main machinery used
was robust multivariable control theory. Fundamental results were derived for
selection of optimal thresholds in innovations-based DIA algorithms. The
estimator logic used in the DIA technique was made robust by providing
robustness both at low and high frequencies. Evaluation results show
improvements compared to previous techniques.
The general contribution of this research has been the extension of
recent advances in robust control system design to sensor DIA and estimator
design. The specific contributions are:
analysis tools with which to quantify the trade-off between
performance robustness and DIA sensitivity;
design methods which allow higher levels of performance
robustness to be achieved for given levels of DIA sensitivity;
demonstration of the applicability of these tools using an
aircraft turbine jet engine multivariable control example.
A powerful synthesis tool has been developed for DIA algorithms. This would
allow for optimal achievable levels of performance. In particular:
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a "threshold selector" has been created which quantifies the
effects of uncertainty on DIA performance;
- measureshave been derived to quantify the uncertainty and the
performance robustness.
The advances to robust estimator design to achieve higher levels of
performance robustness include
the development of estimators using the "internal model
principle" to achieve asymptotic convergence despite model error;
the incorporation of frequency weighting in an LQG cost
functional to modify an estimator design for DIA.
The results were demonstrated on a dynamic simulation of a multivariable
turbofan Jet engine example and showed improvements over previous techniques.
The results of this research can be pursued in other directions. It is
possible that even higher levels of performance are achievable in some cases
by an adaptive technique (see Figure 1.9). It would also be interesting to
pursue the idea of this research in a decentralized control strategy. This is
important as integration of Flight and propulsion control systems is being
considered [25].
134
APPENDIXA
GENERATIONFBOUNDONMODELUNCERTAINTY
A.l SYSTEMUNCERTAINTIES
All nominal design models of a system (plant) contain somedegree of
modeling errors. High fidelity models represent a plant more accurately than
others. These errors are called "model uncertainties." There are, in
general, two types of uncertainties: structured and unstructured. For
example, the former refers to model parameter uncertainties, whereas unmodeled
dynamics lies in the latter category. Reducedorder modeling, linearization
about operating points, neglecting nonlinearities, all result in contributions
to either structured or unstructured uncertainty.
The model uncertainties can be broadly grouped into two categories:
(1) uncertain external inputs
- reference commands
- environmental disturbances
- biases or drifts in a failed sensor
(2) uncertain internal dynamics
- plant model errors
sensor failures
- controller or estimator reconfigurations from DIA
The representations of the model uncertainty vary according to howwell
its structure is known. For a highly structured representation, e.g.,
aerodynamic coefficients in flight control, engine model parameters in engine
control, the uncertainty can be represented by defining a range of variation
in the parameter space. For less structured uncertainties, boundson errors
can be defined. The model uncertainties can in general be classified as
additive or multiplicative. The additive type of model uncertainty is defined
as follows
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with
P(s) = Po(S, c*) + A(S)
;[A(S)] < 6 (_) -V-_ > 0 (A.l)
where P(s) is the transfer function of the plant, Po(S, c*) is the
nominal parameterized model of the plant, with structured uncertainty c*. In
other words, P (s, c*) is a known function of c*, but the values of c*
o
are uncertain. The function a(s) is the variation in the nominal model,
Po' and is an unstructured uncertainty. It is unknown but limited to be
some function bounded by 6 (_), where 6 (_) is a positive
scalar Function which defines a bound on P in the neighborhood of P. It
o
can be viewed as a frequency dependent "radius" of uncertainty of the true
plant, P(s), about some model Po(S, c*) for all c*. Figure A.la
illustrates the additive type of uncertainty. In general a good model will be
well known at low frequencies where _ (_) will be small, and less well
known at high frequencies where 6 (_) will be large. This type of
curve is characteristic of unmodeled, uncertain, high-frequency phenomena.
Note that in equation (A.l), the structure of a(s) is not defined, and may
be caused by a variety of mechanisms (For example, parameter changes,
unmodeled dynamics, etc.). The two types of multiplicative uncertainties are
the input multiplicative and the output multipliqative and are given by the
following equations.
with
with
Input multiplicative:
p(s) : P (s, c*) [I ÷ a(s)]
0
o[A(s)] < am(_) -V-_ _ 0
Output multiplicative:
P(s) = [I + A(s)] Po(S, c*)
(A.2)
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Figure A.la Additive Perturbation
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Figure A.Ib Input Multiplicatlve Perturbation
U I +A by
Figure A.Ic Output Multlplicative Perturbation
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_[a(s)] < _m(_) -_ _ 0 (A.3)
Figure A.Ib and A.Ic shows the representations of the multiplicative type of
uncertainties.
For the multivariable jet engine example [12], an output multiplicative
bound was determined. This bound takes into account both the structured and
unstructured uncertainties. This will represent a bound on such model
uncertainties as, unmodeled dynamics, parameter variation in system matrices
(A, B, C, and D), unmodeled nonlinearities, reduced-order modeling, and
linearization.
A.l.l Why Determine Bounds on Model Errors?
Under the NASA contracts NAS3-22481 and NAS3-23282, the feasibility of
the DIA concept for application to the multivariable jet engine was
demonstrated. However, several problem areas were identified which are stated
below:
(1) steady-state and dynamic mismatch of the simplified nonlinear
models of the engine;
(2) steady-state estimator errors, with no sensor failures;
(3) instabilities when accommodating failures;
(4) accommodation inaccuracies; and
(5) missed detections and false alarms.
These problems arise from system uncertainties.
The fundamental control design problem is to establish the relationship
between performance, robustness, and system uncertainty. The first two are
conflicting requirements and need trade-off or design compromises to meet the
system requirements. A unified method of approach is to:
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(1) establish Quantitative relationships betweenperformance,
robustness, and system uncertainty;
(2) recognize that the plant model error, sensor failures, and DIA
reconfigurations all belong to the same class of system
uncertainty.
Figure A.2 illustrates how the system uncertainties can be isolated. The
dynamic uncertainties such as model errors, sensor failures, and DIA
reconfigurations, are "inside" the system and function as a feedback loop
around the "interconnection" system. This system maps the external and
internal uncertainties into the outputs, i.e., tracking error and filter
residuals. The dynamic uncertainties propagate in a specific way so as to
cause a quantifiable uncertainty about the map from the input into the
outputs, provlded bounds can be found for the dynamic uncertainties. These
bounds are obtainable from simple input/output system tests, and are to be
used in robustifying the filter/s and determining the thresholds.
A.I.2 Model Error Bound for Output Multiplicative Error
A bound for model uncertainties can be obtained experimentally as shown
in F_gure A.2. In F_gure A.2a, P represents a h_gh-fidel_ty simulation of
the plant whereas Po is a simplified low-order linearized model of the
plant. A sinusoidal test input is applied to the plant and the model. The
error is defined as
e = P(s) _u - P (s, c*) &u
0
= (I + 8)Po(S, c*) _u - Po(S' c*) _u
= AP (s, c*) Su (A,4)
0
The normalized error, _(_),
bound, and is given by
provides a worst-case frequency-dependent
II e I1_6(_) --max ...... (A.5)
U II Po(S, C*) &U II2
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Figure A.2a Experiment to Determine Model Error Uncertainty
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Figure A.2b Frequency-Dependent Uncertainty
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where I1,112 iS the norm, and _(w) is the bound on model
uncertainty. Figure A.2b shows a typical bound on the model error
uncertainties, which includes structured and unstructured uncertainties.
A.2 QUANTIFICATION OF MODEL ERROR UNCERTAINTIES
This section describes a method to quantify the model error uncertainties
using the experimental procedure given in Section A.l.2. The error bound was
determined for a Jet engine model [12]. A description of this model is also
included in this section.
A.2.1 Computation of Model Error Bound usinq the Turbofan Model
An experimental procedure to determine a bound on model error was
discussed in Section A.l.2. A nonlinear fourth-order engine model (HYTESS - A
Hypothetical Turbofan Engine Simplified Simulation [12]) was used to represent
the physical plant, i.e., the turbofan engine (see Figure A.2a). The model
P was represented by a linear model of the engine at sea level static
o
flight condition and PLA at 36° (0/0/36). By applying the same sinusoidal
input to P and P an error signal between the outputs is computed using
O'
Eq. (A.4). A frequency-dependent error bound is determined using Eq. (A.5).
The procedure for determining the error bounds is shown in Figure A.2.
step-by-step discussion follows.
The states of the system are:
xl = Fan Speed, SNFAN (Nl) - RPM
x2 = Compressor Speed, SNCOM (N2) - RPM
x3 = Burner Exit Slow Response Temperature, Tt41o - °R
x4 = Fan Turbine Inlet Slow Response Temperature, Tt4.51o - °R
The engine inputs are:
ul = Main Burner Fuel Flow, WFMB - Ib/hr
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u2 = Nozzle Jet Area, Aj - ft 2
u3 = Fan Guide Vane Angle, FGV- deg
u4 = CompressorStator Vane Angle, SVA- deg
u5 = CompressorBleed Flow, BLC- %
The engine outputs are:
yl = Fan Speed, SNFAN(Nl) - RPM
y2 = CompressorSpeed, SNCOM(N2) - RPM
y3 = Burner Pressure, PT4- psia
y4 = AugmentorPressure, PT6- psia
y5 = Fan Turbine Inlet Temperature, FTIT - °R
The system matrices for the linear model and HYTESSare shownin Tables A.l
and A.2, respectively.
A.2.2 Description of the Enqine Models
Two models of a jet engine are discussed in Section A.2.1, namely, HYTESS
and a linear model at 0/0/36. Both models are fourth-order state space
models. HYTESS is a nonlinear model generated by scheduling linear model
-l
matrices (A, A B, C and D) over the Flight envelope using normalized
variables (such as 6, e, P/B, T/e, N/re) as scheduling parameters.
The linear model was extracted from HYTESS at the flight condition of altitude
= 0 feet, Mach No. = O, and PLA = 36°
where
The linear fourth-order state space models are of the form
= Ax + Bu
y = Cx + Du
T
x = Ix l x 2 x3 x4]
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Table A.I
Jet Engine SystemMatrices
A m
-3.9180 2.9550 -1.5450 6.2260
-0.2560 -2. 1480 8.4370 0.0482
-0.0035 -0.0045 -0.6663 0.0003
-0.0075 -0.0146 -0.0499 -2.0000
1.0D+04 *
0.0001
O. O00t
0.0000
0.0000
0.3071
0.0395
0.0002
0.0004
-O. O06B
-0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0021
0.0015
0.0000
0.0000
-1.3290
-0.7886
0.0034
0.1618
C
1.0000
0.0000
0.0147
0.0031
-0.0377
O. 0000
1. 0000
O. 0284
O. 000 t
-0. 073%
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0011
-0.0010
-0.2495
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0009
-0.0007
0.0018
D m
0.0000
0.0000
0.0087
0.0008
0.2050
0.0000
0.0000
-8.2350
-5.7450
18.5200
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
O. t824 O. %B55 -175.8000
0.0462 -0.0032 -6.8890
-0.5299 -1.7080 482.9000
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Table A.2
Simplified Nonlinear Model Matrices
FULL ENVELOPE MODEL OF A MATRIX
F_L,4}--_-_O..9_3E_iZDL_O.-IB86E-2*XPT&*e2-2.463
F_2,_1 ) - -0_ i820E-3*XN1+O_ 27&OE-9_xPT6*XNl**2-30. 7721
F(3, 1) - -0.2_01E-2*XPTb+O. B295E-4*XTT45-O. 8207E-1
F(4, 1) = O.$353E-2/DLl+O. I038E-8*XPT4**3-O. 2724E-1
F(I,2)_r= _0.259bE+I*THl÷O. 815?E-I/DL1÷5.78
E(_?._21- -. -O..2381E+l/.T_i_O_2348E-7*XNI*_+1..549 "-
F(4,2) = -0. IOIOE-I*DLI-O. 2312E-1/DLl+O. 29?bE-!
F(I,3)_.= _I.
F(2,3) = -0.
F(3,3) = -0.
F(4,3) = -0.
F(I,4) = -0.
F(_,4) = O.
F(3,4) = O.
F(4,4) = -0.
597
1569/DL1+O. 23S2E-I*XPT4+4.2890
&377/DL1+O. 5218/THI-0.5229
115b
1143/DL1+O. 8349E-7*XNI**2+I.074
6013E-1
2632E-2
1914E+I/DLl÷Oo !S&4E÷1/THI-1. 568
FULL ENVELOFE MODEL OF A-_ B HATRIX
FI¢(1,1)
FI¢(2ol)
FIg(3,1)
FI¢(4,1)
FIg(1.2)
FI_(2,2)
FIg(3,2)
FI¢(4,2)
FI¢(1,3)
Fig(2,3)
FI¢(3,3)
FI¢(4o3)
FI¢(1,4)
FIC(2,4)
FIG(3,4)
FI¢(4,4)
FIg(I,5)
FIg(2,5)
FI¢(3.5)
FI_(4,5)
•, O.
_0°
O,
O,
m,- toO.
m O.
O,
O.
9327E-3*XNI-O. 3145E-II*XNI**3-6. 5b
3616*THI-O. 3850E+8/XNI**2+0.4541
1183E-3*XPT4-O. 3&3E-@*XPT4**3-O 372E-I
9333E-3*XPT_-O.?744E-9*XNI_XPT_*_2-O. 30_E-I
2971E+2*XPT6+O. 2182E+_/(THl©DLI}-260.4
1121-XN1-0. 1545E-2*XPT4_XPT6**2-7_1.8
5845E-I*XPT4-O. 7198E-4*XPT4*XPT6**2-I. 5_S
3761*XPTa-O. 5675E-4*XPT4*XPT6**2-1".41B
i
i¢
III
III
il
III
lB _0.
Ill _Oo
= O. 16_7*XPT4-O. 4133E-4*XPT4*XPT&**2-2. I04
- 0.275*XPT6-6.304
= O. 130bE-I*XPT6-0.2379
O. I068E-I*XPT&-O. 1881
O. B67OE+I/THI+O. 5OgOE-I*XPT4-2&. 19
O. 11&SE÷3*THI+O. I092E+3/THI-220. 7
0.2010-TH1-0. 12_E-2*XPT4÷O. 2459
O. 938&E-1*THI-O. 1157E-2*XPT4+O. 2_51
O. 5357E÷4/(DLI_RTHI)-_5.87
O. 3754E+4/(DLI*RTHI)+157.9
9392E+2*(RTHI/DL1)-O. 739qE+1*(THI/_Ll**2)÷8 53
85_4E+2*(RTH1/DL1)-O. 5902E÷I_(THI/DLI**_÷9.7
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Table A.2 (Continued)
FULL ENVELOPE MODEL OF C MATRIX
Nil, II - I.
H¢2. i I - O.
HI3* I P " --0, 24J| 41[*1/[PT4-0. 2_?I_-$*IPT4*[PTb 4_. 4"J41i(--t
N(4, I1 * --0. S'I|II/XPT4-'O. 4_:_0_--|0*LN|**2*_. 4_3'b'_-2
H(_ |) - 0. 07141r-3*[PT4*<). Z?Ok_*2/ZPT4-O. )04,?
N(&, || * 0. ffiE4/THI--O. =49|1_*4/tPT4**2*"0. 1514
14(:r, l I - O. 31|gt[--21IPT&--O. 297¢_-l/|PT6**- "_'_ 7264A[-4
"H(j, =) ,i O,
1412. 21 - I.
H(3e.2L.-" __0..241Pl _[.--_/THI _). 4644(-3*IPT&-O. 113_1_-1
14r141 21";';-0. 90001-TeINI--0. 4.6_&41_-IlIpT4*0. IIS_-2
H(Se2$ - "_. |'1271-3e_TT45--0. |_071[*4/[NL_0. _.D14
H( L- 2) " O. g2O7£-f
i417. 21 -- O. 21S_--S10LI_0, 6102/][PT4*_:_0. $_--4
H(I, 31 * 0.
N¢a. 31 - O.
H(3* 3J - -.0. 7370_--Te[PT6-*'t-0. 4_b71[-3
H(4. 31 " --0. _041[_ke]CN2*_. 239_(-2
H(S*3) -- O. 3|||i[-10T_4|_-0, $4e&_--4e_TT4_-0. =i_&2
ki(d_ 3| - 0. 144_--|/0_J.-_. 127|R-3*[H|*Q. 31_k
H(7,3s - -<3. 1322_-S
H(|. 4| - O.
H12. 41 -- O.
H(3. 41 -- .-0. IgOO_-2*_PT6_). 3|7_-2
H(4. 4) e _0. 4:](_)l[--Sel[PT4--0. _|0_-,4
H(_. 41 - O..64_db_-2
H(&. 41 -- O. I14_4[-IIIX.I-0. 130<14[-2,+I[N1,,'.¢. SlrJ
H(7. 41 - --0. 13241-$
ORIGINAL PAC_I;._i:_
POOR QUAL!TY
FULL ENVELOPE MODEL OF D RATRIX
O(l. ll " O.
D12. II o O.
O4l_l. II " -'0. 41_]_(--14*[N1**3+0. I ql_-$l[P_'_'e*:e'0" H7_"_ 2
014, II - -O. 94421[-701[N1--O. 22071-$1IN|*02 +0- .'_Q96_ 2
01_* 11 - _0. :_4|i[-|0TI4|_0. "11"I_[*2/1U_T4*'O. 4q&4_-1
D(dl_ 1| -- -'0. 6e_Oi[+411[NL*_3. 132_A[*_/r.N2*e2*_ 34_0_
0(7. I I - _0, e329(-2/XPT4_0. |03_--4
011,21 - 'J.
0(2, 21 - _.
0(3. 21 - -0, 7192J[-2eIPT6**3*I. 255
014.21 - -0. 4047e[PT/J+_. 9_g
0($*2| * 0. 2&SEI[-2eIPT&**3-?. 119
0(4** 21 " --0. 2704i_-4/T14|*'0. 05_A[*7/M|*131. •
017,21 - -0. 3_621-&eEPT6**3_). 28_1q_-:3
D(I. 3) - O.
0(2* 31 - 0.
01_]_ 3| " 0. 53_ll[-2el_PT4"O. I&70_-S,_IPT4eIpT&**2"O. 4101
014* 3| " O. IIII l _I,I[-'IeEpTd-Q.+ _'_3&_-ql* _PY4* e3"O* 643_-1
O(S*31 -- O. IlI04[--_*EPT4e*3--0. 17111_-_elN|elCPT4_O. _4q'q
O4f&,+311 - O. 1"_4_(_'|e[PTk-I_. &7
O( 7, '11 a+ O. 204q_--'!
0(I. 4| ,', O.
012, 41 - O.
0(3,41 ,, 0.7L_IeTHI--0.4&4,k
0(4. 41 m "0. 36_'2
O(_l* 4 | e "O. 21471*l*THI _O. 271 drd_- ?,lrJ41 _*2- I. 31
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T
u = [uI u2 u3 u4]
T
Y = [Yl Y2 Y3 Y4 ]
A.3 DETERMINATION OF MODEL ERROR BOUND
The procedure for computation of the error bound on modeling error is
shown in Figure A.3, and a step by step discussion follows.
Step l: The input to the system is a sinusoidal signal superimposed on a
constant signal. This input is of a specific frequency and of high amplitude,
i.e., the amplitude of the sinusoid should be carefully selected so that the
region of operation of the simplified model remains linear. The amplitudes of
the sinusoid for each input were determined from Ref. 24. These input
amplitudes give the best overall match between the linear and the nonlinear
models of the engine. These amplitudes are as follows:
u(1) = WFMBH 3 %
u(2) : AJ 3 %
u(3) = ClVV 5 degrees
u(4) = RCVV l degree
u(5) = BLC 0.2 %
The inputs were excited one at a time according to the procedure. The outputs
of P and P are sinusoids superimposed over a transient (system
o
transient), as shown in Figure A.4. Once the transient dies out, the outputs
are sinusoids of constant amplitude. The magnitude of the outputs are
determined by computing the amplitude of the sine waves. The error, e, is
determined by subtracting the output of the plant, y, from the output of the
model, ym, and then computing the magnitude.
_: The bound, 6(w), on the model error is given by
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._CHANGEFREQUENCY
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(PLANT)
Yl (t-z .... s)
I
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COMPUTE THE ERROR
6;.(,,,): llYi "...Y_i11,
IIY'_II_
Ym|
NO
(t-1 .... S)
FIND NORM OF 6 MATRIX
AT FREQUENCY
Figure A.3 Procedure for Computing Error Bound, 6(_o)
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Figure A.4 Compressor Speed Response when CIVV is Modulated with
Sine Wave at 5 Hz
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6(_) =
611 .............. _15
651 .............. 655
(A.6)
Each input when excited, produces errors in all the five outputs, which
determines one column of the 6 matrix. For example, if uI is
modulated with a sinusoid, it produces
_11 = IlYl - Ymlll / Ilymlll' 621 = IlY2 - Ym211 / llym211....
651 =tly 5 - Ym5H / IlYmSll.
This gives the first column of the 6 matrix. Similarly, other four inputs
are excited one at a time to determine the other Four columns of the 6
matrix. To determine the bound at a given Frequency, 25 elements of the 6
matrix have to be computed.
Step 3: The simplified model has a bandwidth of about 5 hz. A range of
Frequencies From 0 hz (DC) to 9 hz was chosen for computation of the
matrix. The discrete Frequencies at which a was computed are O.l, 0.3,
0.5, 0.7, 0.8, l., 2., 3., 4., 5., 7., 9. hz.
St_.__.p_4: At each Frequency, the maximum singular value of the 6(_)
matrix is computed. This is denoted by _[a(_)], and is the worst case
bound at that Frequency. Figure A.4 illustrates a plot of _ against
Frequency.
A.4 DISCUSSION
The bound on the model errors determined in this procedure has some
limitations. The plant is represented by a simplified nonlinear simulation
and the model is linearized at one flight point. This limits the validity of
the model error bound to only one Flight condition. This also does not
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include the errors which arise from the unmodelednonlinearitles and the
linearization of P(s) to produce simplified model Po(S). For a more
general error bound, the plant should be represented by the cycle deck, and
the bound 6 should be determined at all the representative flight points
in the flight envelope. However, cost is an important consideration in such
an exercise.
There are markeddifferences between the theoretical curves of Figure A.2
and Figure A.5. The error bound is expected to grow at high frequencies
(Figure A.2b), but as seen in Figure A.4, it is constant. This is attributed
to the fact that the plant and the model are of the sameorder and have
approximately the sameA, B, C, and D matrices at 0/0/36. The difference in
the system matrices }s that the mode] is represented by the constant A, B, C,
and D matrices (Table A.l) whereas the plant P (s c*) is represented by
i 0 m
the A, B, C, and D matrices which are polynomial functions. The error bound
in this case is a constant. This can be shown using equation A.3 as follows,
P(s) _ [I + a(s)] P (s, c*) (A.7)
o
where P(s) and P (s, c*) are of the same order. In reality, 8(s)
o
would be a complicated transfer function of order different from the order of
P(s) or Po(S, c*). In this case it is simply a constant and therefore the
error bound _(_)
equation,
is a constant in Figure A.5 as shown by the Following
liP(s) - P (s c*)ll
o '
lim
IIPo(S)ll
= lla(s)ll= constant (A.8)
It is expected that if high-frequency dynamics is added to the plant P(s), the
m
high frequency response of _ in Figure A.5 will follow the pattern of
Figure A.2b.
The difference between the two models P(s) and P (s, c*), causes the
o
peak at low frequency in Figure A.S. This difference gives rise to different
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151
dynamic responses. It is expected that if the two models are exactly the same
(no modeling errors), the plot of _ should be a constant, i.e., _(w) -
(constant) = O.
A.5 SUMMARY
A procedure to compute the bound on the modeling errors is developed and
demonstrated on an engine example. The bound is limited to only one flight
condition. For a more general bound, a comprehensive experiment will have to
be run where the plant is represented by the cycle deck and the experiment
conducted at a number of operating points on the Flight envelope, with
particular emphasis on the choice of the amplitude of the input signals.
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